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WHY EVERY STATE SHOULD HAVE AN
INCOME TAX (AND A RETAIL SALES TAX,

TOO)
Herwig Schlunk*

Abstract
Some states (like Florida and Texas) collect retail sales
taxes but no income taxes; one state (Oregon) collects income
taxes but no retail sales taxes; most states collect both. This
paper examines the decision of a state to collect retail sales
taxes, income taxes, or both in light of the state's spending
policy and the ability of at least some of the state's residents to
strategically migrate to another state (to take advantage of a
more favorable mix of taxes and benefits). It concludes that
states that rely solely (or even primarily) on either a retail sales
tax or an income tax to finance their spending are generally
pursuing an irrational and ultimately unstable course. Thus,
states that seek to pursue an ultimately stable course must
include in their revenue streams both a retail sales tax and an
income tax.

Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. The arguments in this paper are
adapted from arguments I have made elsewhere in a completely different context. See
Herwig Schlunk, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Double Taxation, 79 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 127 (2003).
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I. INTRODUCTION

Two funny things happened almost immediately after I
posted an early draft of this paper on the Social Science
Research Network (SSRN). First, a local talk radio host asked if
I would discuss it on air; then, a local tax reform group put me
on its mailing list.1 The former wanted to publicly thrash me for
promoting increased taxation and all the perceived ills that
accompany bigger government. The latter wanted to enlist my
support for its promotion of increased taxation to fund a bigger
and better government. These reactions to my title-and they
must be reactions to my title, since my argument is not one for
either increased taxation or bigger government-led me to
realize the necessity of an immediate disclaimer: THIS PAPER
DOES NOT ADVOCATE INCREASED TAXATION OR
BIGGER GOVERNMENT.
But, neither does this paper
advocate decreased taxation or smaller government. It has no
dog in the hunt of the level of taxation or the size of the
government.
The questions of how much a state wants to spend-and
thus, at least in the long run, how much it needs to tax-and
how the state should ideally raise the amount it wants to spend,
are logically distinct. This paper does not address the former;
only the latter. A state like California or New York might
choose to provide all manner of benefits to, and hence to
undertake all manner of spending on behalf of, its residents; a
state like Tennessee or Texas might choose to provide
considerably fewer benefits, and hence to undertake less
spending. But whatever the level of benefits (spending), the
state must choose how to raise the revenue that will pay for the
benefits (spending). For all but the luckiest states, the revenue
I The title of my earlier draft referenced my home state of Tennessee, a state
without a broad-based income tax. Accordingly, it caught the attention of local residents.
Some Tennesseans get extremely agitated at the mere mention of the possibility of an
income tax, a mention that occurs with some regularity (i.e., whenever the state budget
is in deficit). And other Tennesseans work tirelessly to get an income tax enacted. See
generally John A. Walker III, Why Tennessee Does Not Have an Income Tax, 40 State Tax
Notes 989 (June 26, 2006).
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will come largely from taxes collected from residents. Those
taxes, in turn, may be income taxes or consumption taxes (in
practice, typically retail sales taxes) or a combination of both.
This paper argues for a combination of both. Thus, New York
and Texas should each rely on both income and consumption
taxes; New York's taxes will simply need to be higher as
necessitated by its desired level of spending.
My argument is not based on the benefits of diversifying a
state's revenue sources, although such an argument may well
have merit.2 Rather, my argument is based on the ability of
residents of one state to migrate to another state and the
possibility that such migration will (at least at the margin) be
strategic: an attempt to "arbitrage" the benefits and the costs of
living in the various states. If such migration occurs, and if it
occurs to a significant enough extent, it will undermine the
finances of any state that chooses to rely either solely (or
disproportionately) on an income tax or solely (or
disproportionately) on a retail sales tax, instead of on a
measured combination of both.
Part II of the paper offers a simple model of a state's
finances. The model assumes that states spend money in order
to provide benefits to their residents, sometimes in their
residents' capacities as income producers and sometimes in their
residents' capacities as consumers. It also assumes that states
gather the money that they spend by taxing their residents,
sometimes in their residents' capacities as income producers (an
income tax) and sometimes in their residents' capacities as
consumers (generally a retail sales tax). The model is employed
to derive some insights into the connection between spending
and taxes. In particular, if a state is in competition for residents
with other states, a state's finances will generally be stable if
and only if the state treats its residents "fairly." That is, a state
2 The basic idea would be that an income tax is a more reliable revenue raiser in
good economic times, since incomes generally go up more quickly than consumption
(with savings accounting for the disparity). Conversely, a consumption tax is a more
reliable revenue raiser in bad economic times, since consumption generally falls more
slowly than incomes (with consumption financed by savings accounting for the
disparity).
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must spend amounts collected in taxes from its resident income
producers on goods and services that benefit such income
producers, and it must spend amounts collected in taxes from its
resident consumers on goods and services that benefit such
consumers. Any failure to follow the foregoing strategy will,
over time, lead income producers and/or consumers to migrate to
other states that offer them "fairer" treatment. If a sufficient
number of income producers and/or consumers migrate into or
out of the state, the state will find itself unable to maintain its
original tax and spend policy.
Part III of the paper considers some complicating factors.
For example, not all state spending is financed by state taxes;
some is financed by outside sources such as federal government
grants. Does this alter the conclusion reached in Part II? And
some residents may prefer some types of state taxes to others
due to the I.R.C. § 164 deduction for certain types of state taxes.
Does this alter the conclusion reached in Part II? These and a
number of other questions are probed in some detail, but in each
case they do not, in fact, alter the conclusion reached in Part II
of the paper. Thus, it really is the case that fiscal stability
requires a state to spend amounts collected in taxes from its
resident income producers on goods and services that benefit
such income producers, and to spend amounts collected in taxes
from its resident consumers on goods and services that benefit
such consumers.
Part IV briefly discusses the findings of the three empirical
studies that have addressed some of the issues raised in this
paper. Although each such study is quite narrow-they all focus
solely on the migration of retirees, who are not necessarily a
representative sample of any state's residents (they generally
are more mobile and do not earn active business income)-each
one produced results that are consistent with my model's
predictions. Finally, Part V is a brief conclusion.
II.: A MODEL OF A STATE'S BUDGET

I begin with a simplified model of the finances of the fifty
states. I assume each state makes a governmental spending
decision subject to a budget constraint; a state cannot spend any
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funds it is unable to acquire. I also assume each state is
benevolent: aside from repaying any borrowings (with interest),
it spends solely with the intention of benefiting persons with a
sufficient nexus to the state, e.g., businesses that conduct
business in the state (henceforth, "local businesses") and
individuals who are resident in the state. Further, aside from
incurring borrowings, each state is able to acquire funds solely
by imposing taxes directly on such same persons. From these
assumptions it follows that the net present value of each state's
expenditures on benefits must equal the net present value of
that state's tax collections. Moreover, if each state generally
eschews all but very short-term borrowings, it follows that each
state's annual expenditures on benefits must on balance equal
such state's annual tax collections.
A. Expenditures
How does, or rather how should, a given state think about
its expenditures? The state has a wide menu of goods and
services that it can choose to purchase and provide: police
protection, roads, schools, a legal system, a safety net of health
and welfare benefits, and so on. In order to be provided, such
goods and services should ideally pass the following test: they
should obviate the need for more costly self-help on the part of
the persons who (are intended to and/or do) benefit from the
provision of such goods and services.
For example, a state might consider providing policemen
and a criminal justice system for the purpose of protecting local
businesses: police cruisers would make frequent passes of
business establishments, deterring would-be thieves; police
detectives would investigate business thefts and arrest
perpetrators, further deterring would-be thieves; and courts
would try the arrestees and prisons would house them, still
further deterring would-be thieves. In the absence of these
policemen and this criminal justice system, owners of businesses
would resort to incremental self-help to achieve their desired
optimal amount of deterrence: they might install steel-reinforced
doors or more sophisticated monitoring cameras or hire
additional security guards or whatnot. If the aggregate cost of
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such incremental self-help measures that would be adopted by
all local businesses exceeds the cost of the state-provided
benefits, the state should provide the benefits.
What is the effect on local businesses of the state's decision
whether or not to provide these benefits? Note that the benefits
at issue do not affect the nature of the good or service that any
business produces: the ultimate consumer neither knows nor
cares whether or how the business protected its assets en route
to producing its particular good or service. Thus, so long as a
business is operating in a competitive environment, i.e., is a
price-taker, the presence or absence of the state-provided
benefits does not affect the amount that the business can charge
the ultimate consumer of its good or service. It follows that if
the state does not provide the benefits, and a business instead
incurs incremental expenses to protect itself, such business, or
more correctly the individuals who share in the fruits generated
by such business, will earn diminished profits. Alternatively, if
the state does provide the benefits, and a business therefore
does not incur incremental expenses to protect itself, such
business, or more correctly the individuals who share in the
fruits generated by such business, will earn augmented profits.
Since the individuals who share in the fruits generated by the
business generally include both the legal owners of the business
and the employees of the business,3 I can summarize the
foregoing analysis as follows: a state's provision of policemen
and a criminal justice system will, all else being equal, increase
the income of the owners of any local business or that business's
employees or both.
Of course, a state might also consider providing policemen
and a criminal justice system for the purpose of protecting
personal residences: police cruisers would make frequent passes
through residential neighborhoods, deterring would-be thieves;

3 The owners of a business confronted with diminished margins can either settle for
pocketing a smaller profit attempt to reduce the price they pay to suppliers, including
especially their employees; or most likely do a little bit of both these things. Conversely,
the owners of a business greeted by augmented margins can either pocket a larger profit,
share the wealth with their suppliers, including especially their employees, or most
likely do a little bit of both these things.
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police detectives would investigate break-ins and arrest
perpetrators, further deterring would-be thieves; and courts
would try the arrestees and prisons would house them, still
further deterring would-be thieves.
In the absence of the
policemen and the criminal justice system, homeowners would
resort to incremental self-help: they might place bars over their
windows or install elaborate security systems or buy guns or
whatnot. Once again, if the aggregate cost of such incremental
self-help measures that would be adopted by all homeowners
exceeds the cost of the state-provided benefits, the state should
provide the benefits.4
What is the effect on homeowners of the state's decision
whether or not to provide these benefits? Note that the benefits
at issue do not affect the nature of the good or service that any
homeowner consumes: by definition, the housing services
provided either by the combination of the house and the state's
police protection or by the combination of the house and the
homeowner's incremental self-help measures are identical.
Thus, if the state does not provide the benefits and a homeowner
instead incurs incremental expenses to protect his home, such
homeowner will have less cash available to spend on other
consumption. 5 On the other hand, if the state provides the
benefits and a homeowner therefore does not incur incremental
expenses to protect his home, such homeowner will have more
cash available to spend on other consumption. I can summarize

4 One of the greatest benefits of providing certain services through the state is that
it prevents private wasteful competition. For example, if the state provides security
services that it administers without favoritism, all of its residents will be equally
protected. On the other hand, if individuals invested in their own protection, any one
resident's investment affirmatively harms his neighbors - by making such neighbors
relatively more vulnerable - thus imposing a cost on them. This encourages (indeed
more or less forces) the neighbors to invest as well, thereby leading to an arms race that
may culminate in aggregate expenditures that greatly exceed their marginal benefit.
(Each individual will want to set his marginal cost equal to his marginal benefit. From a
societal viewpoint, however, his marginal cost should be set equal to his marginal benefit
reduced by the marginal harm he inflicts on his neighbors.)
5 Depending on the way in which the state financed the provision of the benefits,
some or all of the cost savings would be capitalized into the price of the home. To the
extent of such capitalization, a subsequent purchaser of the home would not enjoy a
similar windfall.
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the foregoing analysis as follows: a state's provision of policemen
and a criminal justice system will, all else being equal, increase
the level of potential consumption expenditures by homeowners.
There is nothing particularly unique about police protection
and criminal justice infrastructure. Thus, a similar analysis
could be applied to literally all of the goods and services
provided by state government: such goods and services increase
the income that can be earned by local businesses and their
employees and/or stretch the consumption dollars of residents.
For example, good roads enable manufacturers to more cheaply
ship their products; this increases their profits and also
ultimately their ability to pay wages to their employees. In
addition, good roads enable employees to spend less money
repairing the automobiles they use to commute to work; thus,
the income they earn from their employment is greater.6 Good
schools enable employers to spend less money educating their
work force; this increases their profits and ultimately their
ability to pay wages to their employees. Similarly, good schools
enable potential employees to develop skills that will enable
them to perform more complicated tasks; these skills will
increase their productivity and hence their wages. A functioning
legal system enables entrepreneurs to protect their intellectual
property and thereby allows them to create wealth both for
themselves and their employees. A functioning legal system
also ' allows employees to spend less time and money protecting
themselves from all sorts of workplace hazards, thus increasing
the income from their employment. Finally, the existence of a
rudimentary safety net of health and welfare benefits allows
employers to forego providing these benefits to their employees,
thus increasing the employers' profits. Rudimentary health and
welfare benefits also allows employees to ask for wages which
are greater, when the state's benefits are taken into account,

6 The word income in this sentence refers to economic rather than taxable income.
The economic income of a wage earner is the excess of the wages he earns over his costs
of earning such wages; his direct and indirect commuting costs are one of the costs of
earning such wages. The federal income tax, alas, does not tax wage earners on their
economic income: certain costs of earning such income, including specifically direct and
indirect commuting costs, are not generally deductible.
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than they would have been in the absence of the state's
benefits.'
Focusing now on consumers, good roads enable them to
more cheaply visit their relatives; this increases the amount of
money in their pockets for other consumption. Good schools
enable consumers to spend less money educating their children;
this too increases the amount of money in their pockets for other
consumption. A functioning legal system enables consumers to
avoid spending large amounts of money protecting themselves
from unlikely but potentially harmful product defects; this too
increases the amount of money in their pockets for other
consumption. Finally, the existence of a rudimentary safety net
of health and welfare benefits allows consumers to save less to
protect themselves and their families from the effects of certain
personal catastrophes; this yet again increases the amount of
money in their pockets for other consumption.
B. Arithmetic
Solely for purposes of illustration, I will make the foregoing
more concrete with a bit of arithmetic. Suppose, as above, that a
producer of income would, in the absence of any stategovernment-provided package of goods and services, spend a
certain amount of his income to provide himself with benefits
that could, in theory, be provided by the state: protection of
property, transportation services, and so forth. Suppose further
that due primarily to economies of scale, the state can provide
7 Wal-Mart has become notorious for relying on states to provide health care to its
lowest paid employees. Except for the bad publicity, and probably in spite of such
publicity, this practice surely increases its profits. But relying on states to provide
health care also increases the wages, net of the cost of health care, that Wal-Mart pays
its employees. For example, suppose that the health safety net provided by a state is
worth $1 an hour for a low-wage employee. Wal-Mart will be indifferent between paying
such employee a wage a $7 per hour without health benefits and a wage of $6 per hour
with $1 per hour of health benefits. However the employee will prefer the $7 per hour
without health benefits since he can obtain the health benefits from the state "for free."
Ultimately, Wal-Mart and the employee will in some manner split the benefit of the
state's safety net: perhaps Wal-Mart will pay a wage of $6.10 per hour, thus pocketing an
additional $0.90 per hour of profit at the expense of the state. But this means that the
employee is still $0.10 per hour better off than he would have been had Wal-Mart
provided the health benefits directly.
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many of these benefits more cost effectively. For example,
suppose that for every $100 of gross income earned by an income
producer, if the state spends $1 on beneficial goods and services,
it can save such income producer $5 of costs. Under these
predicates, the state should spend at least $1 on such goods and
services; even if the state charges the income producer $1 on
average for such goods and services (e.g., through the tax
system), the producer will net an additional $4 of disposable
income.
Now suppose, given diminishing returns, that each
additional $1 spent by the state on beneficial goods and services
generates progressively smaller cost savings on the part of the
income producer. For example, suppose that the second $1
spent by the state generates $4 of cost savings for the income
producer, the third $1 spent generates $3 of cost savings, and so
on. Given this benefits technology, the state should ideally
spend $5 on goods and services for every $100 of gross income
earned by an income producer.
Table 1: State Benefits Technology ($)
Marginal State
Spending
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Cumulative State
Spending
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Marginal Cost
Savings
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1

Cumulative Cost
Savings
5
9
12
14
15
15
14

Of course, there are lots of reasons why a state might spend
more or less than the ideal amount. The most benign reason for
misspending is that it is far from clear, no matter how much
effort is put into the discovery process, exactly what the true
relation is between state spending and cost savings. There are
less benign reasons as well. For example, a state might spend
more than the ideal amount if its legislative process is captured
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by interest groups, so that the state government, in effect,
behaves less like a benevolent sovereign and more like a puppet
for special interests. On the other hand, a state might spend
less than the ideal amount if its residents and their
representatives have an irrational fear that additional
spending-even additional cost-effective spending-will lead the
state into the clutches of the "socialist" bogeyman.
Finally, note that an identical arithmetic analysis can be
provided for the case of state-provided goods and services that
facilitate consumption. That is, a consumer of income would, in
the absence of a state-provided package of goods and services,
spend a certain amount of his income on certain benefits that
could, in theory, be provided by the state: protection of property,
transportation services, and so forth. Again, due primarily to
economies of scale, the state can provide many of these benefits
more cost effectively. For example, suppose that for every $95 of
gross consumption, if the state spends $1 on beneficial goods and
services, it can save such consumer $5 of costs. Under these
predicates, the state should spend at least $1 on such goods and
services; even if the state charges the consumer $1 on average
for such goods and services (e.g., through the tax system), the
consumer will net an additional $4 of disposable income.
Below, I assume that the state's technology for delivering
benefits that facilitate consumption is essentially identical to
the technology illustrated in Table 1.8 Thus, the first $1 spent
by the state will save the consumer $5 of expenditures; the
second $1 spent will save the consumer $4 of expenditures, and
so on. Once again, the state will ideally spend exactly $5 on
goods and services that facilitate consumption; once again, for a
host of reasons, it might choose to spend either more or less.
C. Tax Collections
There is no such thing as a free lunch. The goods and
services provided by a state are costly. Thus, once a decision has
been reached to provide a given level of goods and services, a
state must find sources of revenue to purchase these goods and
8 See supra Table 1 p. 646.
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services. While there are a host of possible sources that may
defray part of a state's expenditures-lotteries, user fees,
tobacco litigation settlement proceeds, grants from the federal
government, etc.-my model's assumptions reduce the number
to the most significant two: borrowing and taxes. Moreover,
since borrowing along with its attendant interest expense must
eventually be repaid, borrowing does not represent an
independent source of revenue: a borrowing decision is merely
one that pushes taxation into the future. Thus, a state's only
real choice, once it has decided on a spending plan, is whether to
collect its taxes today, tomorrow, or partly today and partly
tomorrow. And, of course, the state must also decide whom or
what to tax.
As a practical matter, the question of whom or what to tax
largely devolves into a question of whether to tax broadlydefined income, broadly-defined consumption, or both. Once
again, this is not to suggest that other alternatives may not
occasionally be available. For example, some states, such as
Alaska, are able to extract considerable revenue from narrowlydefined income taxes, often called severance taxes, while other
states, such as Nevada, are able to extract considerable revenue
from narrowly-defined consumption taxes, often called excise
taxes. For most states, however, such alternatives will not be
available. And for these states the question remains: income
tax, consumption tax, or both.
In answering this question, it should be noted that there is
nothing inherently "unfair" in a state enacting either an income
tax or a consumption tax. As already demonstrated, the goods
and services funded by a state's taxes allow local businesses and
residents to earn or keep incremental amounts of income; taxing
away some or all of such incremental income to pay for the goods
and services that made the incremental income possible would
be the very height of fairness, at least when compared to any
other alternative. Similarly, the goods and services funded by a
state's taxes allow residents to engage in incremental
consumption; taxing away some or all of such incremental
consumption to pay for the goods and services that made the
incremental consumption possible would again be the very
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height of fairness, at least when compared to any other
alternative. Given this, it should not be surprising that most
states, through the combination of an individual (and perhaps
also a corporate) income tax and a retail sales tax, do indeed tax
both income and consumption.
While it is clearly "fair" for a state to tax both income and
consumption, is it in any sense "necessary" for it to do so? That
is, can a state choose to tax either the producers of income (at
the instant of production) or the consumers of income (at the
instant of consumption), but not both, and yet leave all
producers and consumers of income as well off as they would
have been had it chosen to tax both producers and consumers?
It is tempting to think that it can. After all, every producer of
income is also a consumer of income; all income produced (i.e.,
earned) is eventually consumed.9 Thus, a decision to solely tax
income can be viewed as being in part a decision to tax the
ultimate consumption of such income, albeit perhaps a long time
before such consumption actually occurs. Similarly, a decision
to solely tax consumption can be viewed as being in part a
decision to tax the income that facilitated such consumption,
albeit perhaps a long time after such income was actually
earned.
Given this, it is hardly surprising that it is possible to
construct parameters under which it is equivalent for a state to
opt either for a tax solely on income or for a tax solely on
consumption, rather than for a combination of the two. To
illustrate, suppose that a state knows all of the following:
The goods and services the state intends to provide to
facilitate the earning of $100 of income by a resident individual
1°
will cost the state $5 to provide.
The goods and services the state intends to provide to
facilitate the consumption of $90 of income by a resident

9 True, the consumption may occur a long time after the production (perhaps by an
heir many generations distant), but why should that matter?
10 1 make no assumption, in this subsection, as to the value of the benefit the income
producer receives from the state's expenditures, other than that such value at least
equals the state's costs.
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individual will cost the state $5 to provide. 1'
The relative cost of the goods and services the state intends
to provide, in relation to the amount of income or consumption
such goods and services facilitate, will not vary over time.
All income produced in the state is ultimately consumed in
the state, perhaps by the resident individual who earned the
income, perhaps by his heirs.
Under these predicates, the state might consider imposing a
5% income tax (i.e., a tax on the production of income) and a
5.55% retail sales tax (i.e., a tax on the consumption of income).
Under such a tax structure, an individual would pay $5 of
income tax as and when he earns $100 of income, which is
precisely the amount of tax necessary to pay for the goods and
services that the state provides for his benefit in his capacity as
a producer of income. Then, if he immediately consumes $90 of
his after-income-tax income, he would pay an additional $5 of
retail sales tax, which is precisely the amount of tax necessary
to pay for the goods and services that the state provides for his
benefit in his capacity as a consumer of income. Alternatively, if
he invests his $95 of after-income-tax income, perhaps for 23.5
years at an after-tax rate of 3%, so that his original $95 will
double to $190, and if he then consumes $180 of this amount, his
consumption will benefit from $10 of contemporaneous state
expenditures, and at a 5.55% retail sales tax rate, this is
precisely the amount of tax he will then be required to pay.
While this combination of state-levied taxes is certainly the
most natural, an infinite number of other combinations are
possible. I will consider only two of these. At one extreme, the
state could impose a 10% income tax, with no additional retail
sales tax. Under such tax scheme, the state would collect $10
at the time the individual earns $100 of income, but would only
need $5 of that amount to cover the cost of the goods and
services it provides with respect to his productive activity.
Accordingly, it would have $5 either to spend immediately to
facilitate the individual's $90 of consumption, should the
11 I make no assumption, in this subsection, as to the value of the benefit the
consumer receives from the state's expenditures, other than that such value at least
equals the state's costs.
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individual choose to immediately consume his after-tax income,
or to invest if the individual instead chooses to invest and hence
defer his consumption. Assuming that the state invests at the
same rate of return as the individual, 12 and assuming as above
that the individual invests for a total of 23.5 years prior to
engaging in consumption, the state's $5 will increase to $10 at
the same time that the individual's $90 increases to $180. Thus,
when the individual spends his $180 on consumption, the state
will spend its $10 on facilitating goods and services, and both
the state and the individual will end up in exactly the same
position they were in under a regime with a 5% income tax and
a 5.55% sales tax.
At the other extreme, the state could impose no income tax
at all, but simply collect an 11.1% retail sales tax. Under this
alternative, and focusing solely on the case of deferred
consumption, the state would need to borrow $5 at the time the
individual earns his income since it would have no tax revenue
to spend to provide the goods and services that are necessary to
facilitate his production of the income.
Without loss of
generality, and to simplify matters, suppose the state borrows
the $5 from the individual himself. Now, if the individual again
waits 23.5 years prior to engaging in consumption, the
individual's $5 invested with the state will grow to $10, and his
$95 invested elsewhere will grow to $190. In all, he would have
$200 to spend.
Thus, he could spend $180 prior to the
imposition of the 11.1% sales tax. The state would collect $20 of
sales tax, use $10 to pay off its borrowing, and use the
remainder to purchase the $10 of goods and services that
facilitate the individual's consumption. Once again, both the
state and the individual end up in exactly the same position
they were in under a regime with a 5% income tax and a 5.55%
sales tax.

12 The state should be able to invest at a higher rate, since it is not taxable. But
perhaps for political reasons, states do not generally collect surpluses and invest them
for long periods of time. Thus, a state that collects a surplus will almost surely use such
surplus to retire its existing debt obligations. If so, it effectively earns the same rate of
return on such surplus as it would have paid on its debt obligations. And this, in turn, is
the same rate of return as the individual earns.
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While the foregoing illustration demonstrates the
theoretical possibility that a state could be in a position where it
can opt either for a traditional combination of an income tax and
a retail sales tax or for a fully equivalent income tax without a
retail sales tax or for a fully equivalent retail sales tax without
an income tax, it is unlikely that a state will ever find itself in
this position. This is because the predicates that allow for the
income-tax-only or the retail-sales-tax-only alternatives will
generally not be satisfied.
D. Tax Collections When Expenditures Vary over Time
The cost of the goods and services a state provides, relative
to the amount of income or consumption such goods and services
facilitate, may vary over time. In particular, the tastes and
expectations of residents as to what goods and services are or
are not necessary or appropriate for a state to provide tend to
change. Sometimes the political winds are such that a state is
expected to provide lots of goods and services. Other times
state-provided goods and services are expected to be pared to the
bone.' 3 Only the traditional combination of an income tax and a
retail sales tax can effectively take these changes into account,
and thus ensure that each resident individual is taxed
appropriately given the goods and services that the state
actually provides for his benefit. To illustrate, suppose that
At the time an individual earns $100 of income, the goods
and services the state provides to facilitate such income cost the
state $5. Moreover, at that same time, the goods and services
the state provides to facilitate $90 of consumption cost the state
$5.
At the time the individual spends his after-income-tax
invested income, perhaps 23.5 years later, state finances have
changed so that the state provides goods and services costing
only $3 to facilitate the production of every $100 of income.
Moreover, at that same time, the goods and services the state
1S Neither of these circumstances will necessarily be based on whether the state's
expenditures are cost effective, although they may be based on popular perceptions of
such cost effectiveness.
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provides to facilitate $94 of consumption also cost the state only
$3.
For purposes of comparison, the three tax regimes that I
will have the state consider are either (1) an income tax at a rate
of 5% today and reduced to 3% in 23.5 years combined with a
retail sales tax at a rate of 5.55% today and reduced to 3.2% in
23.5 years, (2) an income tax at a rate of 10% today and reduced
to 6% in 23.5 years, with no accompanying retail sales tax, and
(3) a retail sale tax of 11.1% today and reduced to 6.4% in 23.5
years, with no accompanying income tax. Thus, I assume that
the state's tax regime always reflects the current costs of the
goods and services it provides. I also assume that if the state
relies either solely on an income tax or solely on a consumption
tax, it will impose a tax rate implicitly based on the assumption
that all income is immediately consumed. This may or may not
be the most realistic assumption. 14 However, the state must
make some assumption, and whatever assumption it makes
produces the problem I describe below. Thus, for the sake of
exposition, I make the stated assumptions.
How do the three alternative tax regimes compare? Under
the first regime, with its combination of an income tax and a
retail sales tax, the individual earns $100 today and
immediately coughs up $5 of income tax. He invests his
remaining $95 for 23.5 years, watching the amount double. He
15
then spends $184 on consumption, coughing up $6 of sales tax.
The state, meanwhile, spends $5 today on goods and services to
facilitate the individual's $100 of earnings and spends an
additional $6 in 23.5 years to facilitate his $184 of consumption.
Since the state's tax revenues at all times exactly match its
spending, the state never has either a surplus or a deficit, and
14 It is probably an acceptable assumption when aggregated over all residents, given
See
States.
United
the
rate in
savings
low aggregate
the very
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=120&ViewSeries=N
O&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Pace=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=19
96&LastYear=2008&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no#Mid (last visited Feb. 26,
2009).
15 1 have rounded these numbers, since using the actual numbers, $184.11 and
$5.89, would diminish the aesthetics of the main text without in any way changing the
argument. I will similarly round certain numbers in the paragraphs that follow.
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moreover has no need to engage in any borrowing or lending
activity.
Under the second regime, which features solely an income
tax, the analysis becomes more interesting. The individual
earns $100 today and immediately coughs up $10 of income tax.
He invests his remaining $90 for 23.5 years, watching the
amount double. He then spends all $180 on consumption, since
the state imposes no sales tax. The state, meanwhile, spends $5
today on goods and services to facilitate the individual's $100 of
earnings, and spends an additional $5.75 in 23.5 years to
facilitate his $180 of consumption. To offset this spending, it
collects $10 of income tax today. After paying $5 for today's
provision of goods and services, it has $5 remaining which it
presumably uses to pay off existing indebtedness, thus
effectively investing such amount at a rate that will see the
amount double over 23.5 years. Therefore, in 23.5 years, the
state has $10 available to finance its spending on the goods and
services that facilitate the individual's consumption. Since it
spends only $5.75 on such goods and services, it pockets $4.25.
Thus, the state has effectively overcharged the individual by
this amount for the goods and services it has provided to him.
Finally, under the third regime, which features solely a
retail sales tax, the individual earns $100 today and pays no
state income tax. He invests his $100 for 23.5 years, watching
the amount double. He then spends $188 on consumption, and
coughs up his remaining $12 to pay his sales tax obligation. The
state, meanwhile, spends $5 today on goods and services to
facilitate the individual's $100 of earnings and spends an
additional $6 in 23.5 years to facilitate his $188 of consumption.
To offset this spending, it must borrow $5 today. The amount
owed for this borrowing compounds over the ensuing 23.5 years;
at the end of this time, the state owes $10. Since this $10 is
combined with the state's future expenditure of $6, the state
must now find aggregate revenue of $16. Alas, its only revenue
source is the individual's retail sales tax payment of $12. Thus,
The state has effectively
the state has a shortfall of $4.
undercharged the individual by this amount for the goods and
services it has provided to him.
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Obviously, only the first of these three alternatives is fully
satisfactory. Under a properly designed combination of an
income tax and a retail sales tax, a state runs a balanced budget
with respect to each and every one of its residents. Thus,
importantly, it does not transfer wealth from one resident
(whether in his capacity as a producer of income or a consumer
of income) to another resident (whether in his capacity as a
producer of income or as a consumer of income).16
Neither of the other two tax regimes shares this feature.
For example, in the income-tax-only tax regime, the state
overcharges the resident (henceforth, Taxpayer #1) in my
illustration.' 7 This overcharging does not necessarily mean that
the state runs an overall budget surplus. To see this, suppose
that there is a second resident in the state, Taxpayer #2, who
has a consumption and production pattern that is essentially the
reverse of that of Taxpayer #1: Taxpayer #2 initially spends $90,
funded by borrowing, and 23.5 years later earns $191.50, which
he uses in part ($180) to pay off his borrowing and in part
Note that under these
($11.50) to pay his income taxes.
assumptions the state does not at any time have an unbalanced
budget. However, it has transferred wealth ($2.12 in terms of
net present value or $4.25 in terms of future value) from
Taxpayer #1 to Taxpayer #2.

16 Of course, nothing prevents the state from explicitly transferring wealth from one
resident to another, for example, through a program establishing a social safety net.
But, any such transfer would be explicit and therefore transparent, rather than simply a
consequence of the design of the tax regime.
17 Under the alternative assumption that the relative cost of state-provided goods
and services rises over time, the state would have undercharged the resident in the
illustration.
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Wealth Transfer under an Income-Tax-Only Regime
Taxpayer #2

Taxpayer #1

Time = 0
Tax
collections
Cost of state

Income
100
10

Consumption

5

NPV

Income

NPV

10

Consumption
90
0

5

5

5

0

benefits
Time = 23.5

180

Tax
collections
Cost of state

0

0

11.5

5.75

5.75

2.875

5.75

2.875

191.5

benefits

And, of course, the identical result obtains under the retailsale-tax-only tax regime. In my illustration, Taxpayer #1 is
undercharged. But once again, this does not imply that the
state's overall budget is in deficit. Thus, suppose Taxpayer #2
has a consumption and production pattern that is essentially the
reverse of that of Taxpayer #1: Taxpayer #2 initially spends $90
on consumption plus $10 on the retail sales tax, all funded by
borrowing, and 23.5 years later earns $200, which he uses to pay
off his entire borrowing. Once again, note that the state does
not at any time have an unbalanced budget. However, it has
transferred wealth ($2 in terms of net present value or $4 in
terms of future value) from Taxpayer #2 to Taxpayer #1.
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Wealth Transfer under a Sales-Tax-Only Regime
Taxpayer #1
Income Consumption

Time = 0
100
Tax collections 0
Cost of state 5

Taxpayer #2
Income Consumption

90
10
5

0
5

benefits
Time = 23.5

188

Tax collections
Cost of state

12
6

benefits

NPV

NPV

10
5

200

6
3

0
6

0
3

IIII

When the mere design of a state's tax regime causes an
unintended transfer of wealth from one resident to another, it
poses a problem. Why is the state rewarding either Taxpayer #1
or Taxpayer #2, as the case may be, and punishing the other? It
is doing so for no reason at all. And that is the essence of
unfairness. Fortunately for taxpayers, there is a self-help
remedy that will overcome the unfairness. Indeed, it will
overcome the unfairness even under circumstances where there
is no systematic long-term unfairness, no systematic lifetime
transfer of wealth from one resident to another, but merely a
temporary unfairness, a temporary transfer of wealth from one
resident to another. Unfortunately for states, reliance on such
self-help remedy will lead to budgetary chaos.
E. Strategic Behavior on the Partof Taxpayers (Most Simple
Case)
Return to the case above where the tastes and expectations
for government expenditures do not vary over time; the
government at all times spends $5 to provide goods and services
that facilitate the earning of $100 of income, and at all times
spends $5 to provide goods and services that facilitate $90 of
consumption. But suppose that the state chooses to finance its
expenditures solely with a 10% income tax. Taxpayer #1 earns
$100 today and pays $10 of income tax, half in respect of state-
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provided goods and services that facilitate his earning of the
income, and half in the expectation that the state in the future
will provide him with adequate goods and services to facilitate
his consumption. Taxpayer #2 consumes $90 today and enjoys a
temporarily free ride at the state's expense. Time passes, 23.5
years in all. At the end of this time, Taxpayer #1 spends $180
on consumption; the state in turn spends $10 to facilitate this
consumption. Or at least it wants to.
But alas it may have no revenue. Why? The state was
relying on its receipt of the income tax that Taxpayer #2 would
pay when he earns the income he needs to earn to pay off the
debt he incurred to finance his original consumption. Indeed,
Taxpayer #2 could, as assumed above, earn $200, pay $20 of
income tax, and thus clear the $180 required to pay off his debt.
If he does this, all is well. But he may follow a different tack.
Taxpayer #2 might observe that the state will only spend $10 for
the goods and services that it provides in connection with his
production of $200 of income. Since it is charging him $20 for
Thus,
these goods and services, it is overcharging him!1 8
states-he
does,
eye
at
other
cast
a
wistful
Taxpayer #2 might
after all, have another 49 to choose from-to see if any of them
offers a better balance between the costs it charges in connection
with the production of income (i.e., its income tax) and the value
of the goods and services it provides in connection with such
production. If Taxpayer #2 finds another state with a costbenefit balance that is more to his liking, 9 he might switch his
residence to that state. And in that case, his original home state
will not receive the revenue it expected to receive from him.

18 It does not matter that the state's $10 expenditure on goods and services might
save Taxpayer #2 more than $20 of costs relative to the baseline of the state of nature, so
that Taxpayer #2 still receives a net benefit even in the face of paying the tax. If the
state can purchase the goods and services for $10, charging $20 is overcharging, pure
and simple.
19 For example, and most simply, Taxpayer #2 might find a state that offers an
identical package of benefits, but that only charges - by means of its income tax - their
actual cost of $10.
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Strategic Behavior under an Income-Tax-Only Regime

Time = 0
Tax collections
Cost of state
benefits
Time = 23.5
Tax collections
Cost of state
benefits
I

Taxpayer #1
Income Consumption
100
10
5
180
0
10(?)

10
5

Taxpayer #2
Income Consumption
90
0
5

0
5(?)

0
0
0

NPV

NPV
0
5

-0
0
I

The analysis for a retail-sales-tax-only regime is similar.
Taxpayer #1 earns $100 today and pays no income tax; the state
expects that he will later spend this income and thus pay retail
sales tax that among other things will effectively offset the $5
cost of the goods and services with which it currently provides
him. Taxpayer #2 consumes $90 today, pays $10 of sales tax,
and thus ensures balance in the state's current budget.
Although he only receives $5 of state-provided goods and
services in connection with his consumption, he does not mind;
he expects that the state will give him a free ride when he later
earns the income necessary to pay off his consumption-related
debt. Time passes; 23.5 years in all. At the end of this time,
Taxpayer #2 earns $200; the state spends $10 to facilitate his
production of income. Or at least it wants to.
But again it may have no revenue. Why? The state was
relying on its receipt of the retail sales tax that Taxpayer #1
would pay when he spends the income he previously earned.
Indeed, Taxpayer #1 could, as assumed above, spend $180 on
consumption and thus pay $20 of sales tax. If he does this, all is
well. But he may not do this. Instead, Taxpayer #1 might
observe that the state only spends $10 on the goods and services
that it provides in connection with his $180 of consumption
spending. Since it is charging him $20 for such goods and
services, it is overcharging him! Thus, Taxpayer #1 might cast a
wistful eye at other states-he too has another 49 to choose

I
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from-to see if any of them offers a more favorable balance
between the costs it charges in connection with the consumption
of income (i.e., its sales tax) and the value of the goods and
services it provides in connection with such consumption. If
Taxpayer #1 finds a state with a cost-benefit balance more to his
liking, he very well might switch his residence to that state.
And in that case, his original home state will not receive the
revenue it counted on receiving from him.
Strategic Behavior under a Sales-Tax-Only Regime

Time = 0
Tax collections
Cost of state
benefits
Time = 23.5
Tax collections
Cost of state
benefits
I

Taxpayer #1
Income Consumption
100
0
5
0
0
0

NPV
0
5

0
0
IIII

Taxpayer #2
Income Consumption
90
10
5
200
0
10 (?)

NPV
10
5

0
5 (?)

F. Strategic Behavior on the Part of Taxpayers (Less Simple
Case)
The foregoing illustration of the breakdown of a state's
budget posited residents who in the given tax years either
earned income or engaged in consumption, but not both. In the
real world, many, or even most, individuals in most tax years
both earn income and engage in consumption. Nonetheless,
many individuals have tax years in which they are net earners
of income and other tax years in which they are net consumers.
Would this reality change the outcome of my analysis?
Suppose there are only three states (State 1, State 2, and
State 3) and they are in all relevant ways identical. Each state
initially has three residents: Al, B1, and C1 are the residents of
State 1; A2, B2, and C2 are the residents of State 2; A3, B3, and
C3 are the residents of State 3. Each resident named A is a net
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income producer: he earns 10% more income than the average
individual, but consumes 10% less than the average individual.
Each resident named B is neither a net income producer nor a
net consumer: he earns and consumes the same amount as the
average individual. And each resident named C is a net
consumer: he earns 10% less income than the average
individual, but consumes 10% more than the average individual.
Initial Distribution of Income and Consumption
State 1

State 2

Income

Consumption

Al

110

90

B1

100

100

Cl

90

110

State 3

Income

Consumption

A2

110

90

A3

B2

100

100

B3

C2

90

110

C3

Income

Consumption

110

90

100

100

90

110

Each state wants to provide benefits to both its income
producers and consumers.
Moreover, each state envisions
identical expenditures with respect to income and consumption:
it would like to spend an amount equal to 5% of income in ways
that will benefit the production of income, and it would like to
spend an amount equal to 5.55% of consumption in ways that
will benefit consumers. However, each state opts for a different
financing scheme. State 1 imposes solely a 10% income tax to
fund its benefits expenditures; State 2 imposes both a 5%
income tax and a 5.55% consumption (sales) tax; and State 3
imposes solely an 11.1% consumption (sales) tax. The following
table sets forth each individual's tax payments.
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Initial Distribution of Tax Payments
State 1

Resident
Al
B1
C1

Income
Tax
-11
-10
-9

State 2

Sales
Tax

Resident
A2
B2
C2

Income
Tax
-5.5
-5
-4.5

State 3

Sales
Tax
-4.5
-5
-5.5

Resident

Income
Tax

A3
B3
C3

Sales
Tax
-9
-10
-11

I initially assume that state spending is only marginally
efficient: each dollar spent by the state provides its intended
beneficiary with a dollar's worth of benefit.
Under this
assumption, the following table sets forth the benefit each
individual receives from state expenditures, with the benefit
divided into the benefit received with respect to income
producing activity and the benefit received with respect to
consumption activity.
Initial Distribution of Benefits

Al
B1
C1

State 1
Earning
Benefit
5.5
5
4.5

Consuming
Benefit
4.5
5
5.5

A2
B2
C2

State 2
Earning
Benefit
5.5
5
4.5

Finally, the following table
payments and benefits receipts
amount of wealth transferred to
result of the states' tax-and-spend

Consuming
Benefit
4.5
5
5.5

A3
B3
C3

State 3
Earning
Benefit
5.5
5
4.5

Consuming
Benefit
4.5
5
5.5

shows the net effect of tax
for each individual, i.e., the
or from each individual as a
policies.
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Initial Distribution of Unintended Wealth Transfers
State 1
Net Benefit
Al
B1
Cl

-1
0
1

State 2
Net Benefit
A2
B2
C2

0
0
0

State 3
Net Benefit
A3
B3
C3

1
0
-1

Suppose there is a fair deal of resistance to moving (after
all, moving is a costly enterprise), even in the face of an
unfavorable balance of taxes and benefits. Thus, I assume that
a resident of one state will only move to another state if he can
improve his net benefit profile by an amount greater than 1.
Under this assumption, Al migrates from State 1 to State 3 and
C3 migrates from State 3 to State 1. The following table shows
the new alignment of individuals.
Intermediate Distribution of Income and Consumption
State 1

Income

State 2

Consumption

State 3

Income

Consumption

A2

110

90

B1

100

100

B2

100

100

Cl,

90

110

C2

90

110

Al,
A3
B3

Income

Consumption

110

90

100

100

C3
Following the migration, each state attempts to maintain
its original tax-and-spend policy. The first part of this attempt
is easy: State 1 continues to impose a 10% income tax; State 2
continues to impose both a 5% income tax and a 5.55% sales tax;
and State 3 continues to impose an 11.1% sales tax. The
following table sets forth each individual's new tax payments.
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Intermediate Distribution of Tax Payments
Resident

B1
C1, C3

State 1
Income Sales
Tax
Tax

Resident
A2
B2
C2

-10
-9

State 2
Income
Tax
-5.5
-5
-4.5

Sales
Tax
-4.5
-5
-5.5

Resident

State 3
Income
Tax

A1, A3
B3

Sales
Tax
-9
-10

Now, a snag arises. State 1 would like to spend $30 on
benefits ($5 to facilitate Bl's income production; $4.50 to
facilitate each of Cl's and C3's income production; $5 to
facilitate Bl's consumption; and $5.50 to facilitate each of Cl's
and C3's consumption), but it only collects $28 of tax revenue.
Thus, State 1 must make an accommodation: I assume that it
reduces its desired spending across the board by the fraction
28/30. For similar reasons, State 3 will also need to curtail its
spending by a like amount. The following table shows the
benefit that the individuals now receive.
Intermediate Distribution of Benefits
State 1
Earning
Benefit

B1
C1,
C3

4.67
4.203

A2

State 2
Earning
Benefit
5.5

Consuming
Benefit
4.5

B2
C2

5
4.5

5
5.5

Consuming
Benefit

4.67
5.137

State 3
Earning
Benefit
5.137

Al,
A3
B3 4.67

Consuming
Benefit
4.203
4.67

And the following table shows the net effect of tax
payments and benefits receipts for each individual in light of the
first wave of migration.
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Intermediate Distribution of Unintended Wealth Transfers
State 1
Net Benefit
A2
B2
C2

-0.66
0.33

B1
C1, C3

State 2
Net Benefit
0
0
0

Al, A3
B3

State 3
Net Benefit
0.33
-0.66

Alas, with the passage of time, individual resistance to
relocation is sure to decrease. Thus, I assume there will be a
second wave of migration, with individuals relocating so long as
they can improve their net benefit position by an amount
greater than 0.5. Under this assumption, B1 moves from State 1
to State 2, and B3 moves from State 3 to State 2. Note that
States 1 and 3 have now lost population, while State 2 has
gained population.
The following table shows the new
alignment of individuals.
Final Distribution of Income and Consumption
State 1
Income Consumption

State 2
Income Consumption
A2

110

B1, 100
B2,

90

C3

90

110

C2

Al,
A3

110

90

100

B3

C1,

State 3
Income Consumption

I

90

110

I
Following this migration, each state once again attempts to
maintain its prior tax-and-spend policy. And once again, the
first part of this attempt is easy: State 1 continues to impose a
10% income tax; State 2 continues to impose both a 5% income
tax and a 5.55% sales tax; and State 3 continues to impose an
11.1% sales tax. The following table sets forth each individual's
new tax payments.
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Final Distribution of Tax Payments
Resident

State 1
Income Sales
Tax
Tax

C1, C3

-9

State 2
Resident Income
Tax
A2
-5.5
B1, B2, -5
B3
C2
-4.5

Sales Resident
Tax
-4.5
Al, A3
-5

State 3
Income Sales
Tax
Tax
-9

-5.5

This set of tax collections poses the same problem
encountered in the prior iteration. State 1 would ideally like to
spend $20 on benefits ($4.50 to facilitate each of Cl's and C3's
income production; and $5.50 to facilitate each of Cl's and C3's
consumption), but it only collects $18 of tax revenue. Thus,
State 1 must make an accommodation: I assume that it further
reduces its spending across the board to 18/20 of the ideally
desired amount. For similar reasons, State 3 will also need to
curtail its spending, with the ultimate effect that it too will
spend 18/20 of the ideally desired amount. The following table
shows the benefits that the individuals receive in light of these
accommodations.
Final Distribution of Benefits
State 1
Earning
Benefit

Consuming
Benefit
A2

C1,
C3

4.05

4.95

State 2
Earning
Benefit
5.5

B1, 5
B2,
B3
C2 4.5

Consuming
Benefit
4.5

Al,
A3

State 3
Earning
Benefit
4.95

Consuming
Benefit
4.05

5

5.5

The following table shows the net effect of tax payments
and benefits receipts for each individual in light of both waves of
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migration. Note, importantly, that the net benefit that State 1
temporarily, albeit inadvertently, provided to consumers has
evaporated, as has the net benefit that State 3 temporarily,
albeit inadvertently, provided to income producers.
Final Distribution of Unintended Wealth Transfers
State 1
Net Benefit

C1, C3

0

A2
B1, B2, B3
C2

State 2
Net Benefit
0
0
0

Al, A3

State 3
Net Benefit
0

Also, note that a lingering effect of a state's attempt to
impose asymmetric taxes is that such state attracts
disproportionate numbers of individuals who disproportionately
benefit from its asymmetric tax structure. At the end of the day,
this means that such state will generate less per capita tax
revenue than it would have generated absent the asymmetry
and the resulting taxpayer migration. It follows that if such
state's benefit spending is efficient-i.e., that a dollar of
spending provides at least a dollar of benefit, and possibly a lot
more-the residents of such states will suffer relative to the
residents of states without asymmetric tax structures. 20 For
example, suppose in the relevant spending range, that each $1
spent by a state on benefits provides residents with benefits that
they privately value at $1.50. The following table shows the
benefits that the individuals in the last iteration above would
receive in light of this multiplier.

20

Of course, if the state's benefit spending is inefficient, a lower level of per capita

spending is an affirmative good.
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Final Distribution of Gross Benefits if Spending is Efficient
State 1

State 2

State 3

Earning

Consuming

Earning

Consuming

Earning

Consuming

Benefit

Benefit

Benefit

Benefit

Benefit

Benefit

A2

8.25

6.75

7.425

6.075

B1,
B2,

7.5

7.5

6.75

8.25

Al,
A3

B3

Cl,

6.075

7.425

C2

C3
And the following table shows the net effect of tax
payments and benefits receipts for each individual in light of the
multiplier. Note that under these assumptions, if the net
benefit threshold for migration falls a tiny bit further, so that
individuals migrate whenever they can improve their net benefit
by an amount at least equal to 0.5, the remaining residents of
States 1 and 3 will migrate to State 2. States 1 and 3 would be
empty!
Final Distribution of Net Benefits if Spending is Efficient
State 1
Net Benefit

C1, C3

4.5

A2
B1, B2, B3
C2

State 2
Net Benefit
5
5
5

Al, A3

State 3
Net Benefit
4.5

G. Conclusion
If a state unwittingly transfers wealth from one taxpayer to
another, even only temporarily, it is not merely acting
"unfairly," it is also acting in a self-defeating manner. That is,
unless every other even remotely comparable state adopts
essentially identical policies, some taxpayers will choose to move
or threaten to move to take advantage of the irrationality of the
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state's tax-and-spend policies, thereby plunging the state into
budgetary chaos. In effect, the state will lose the ability to fully
and rationally determine the level of its expenditures; instead, it
will cede control of such expenditures to (the most mobile of) its
residents.

III.:

COMPLICATING FACTORS

As the foregoing model of state finances paints a simplified
picture of reality in a number of significant respects, it is worth
asking whether any of these simplifications casts serious doubt
on its conclusion. Among the potentially complicating factors I
will consider when addressing this question are: (1) the effect of
federal grants, (2) the effect of federal income tax rules, in
particular I.R.C. § 164's deduction for certain state and local
taxes, (3) the effect of local government actions on the choice of
where to live, (4) the absolute and relative efficiency of state and
local expenditures, (5) the effect of the possible capitalization of
taxes or benefits into asset prices, and (6) the relevance of the
difference between active income and passive income and hence
of active income producers and passive investors. This part will
also address the question of whether the mere existence of a
state income tax inevitably leads to higher overall levels of
taxation (and hence perhaps to waste).
A. Basic Relationships
In Part II, I posited a relationship-purely for illustrative
purposes-between state spending and the cumulative cost
savings enjoyed by an income producer as a result of such
spending. I now denote cost savings as CSI; CSI is a generally
increasing function of state spending SI (although a level may be
reached
where
additional
state
spending
becomes
counterproductive); I can therefore write CSI(SI). SI, in turn, is
the sum of a fraction a of income taxes IT collected, a fraction P
of consumption taxes CT collected, and a fraction y of federal
grants F received,2 1 so that SI = aIT + PCT + yF. Thus, I can
21 This list of sources of state revenue is not technically exhaustive, but can be
treated as if it is. Hence, in what follows, miscellaneous sources of revenue are included
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write CSI(cIT + 3CT + yF). 22 Since income taxes are a cost to an
income producer, a resident income producer's net benefit from
state spending and taxation is CSI(ccIT + OCT + yF) - IT.
All else being equal, the last expression above is what an
income producer hopes (and seeks) to maximize.2 3 On balance,
he is happier when relevant state spending is higher (so long as
it is not so high that it actually becomes counterproductive), but
is happier still if such state spending is borne by others, whether
consumers or the federal government. In the simplest case in
which all states possess the same technology for turning
spending into cost savings and all states in fact choose the same
level of spending, an income producer will prefer the state that
funds its spending with the smallest amount of income taxes.
Of course, a parallel analysis can be undertaken for
consumers. Cost savings CSC is a generally increasing function
of state spending SC (although a level may be reached where
additional state spending becomes counterproductive); I can
therefore write CSC(SC). SC in turn is the sum of a fraction (1 a) of income taxes IT collected, a fraction (1 - 3) of consumption
taxes CT collected, and a fraction (1 - y) of federal grants F, so
that SC = (1 - ot)IT + (1 - O)CT + (1 - y)F. Thus, I can write
CSC((1 - a)IT + (1 - )CT + (1 - y)F). Since consumption taxes
are a cost to a consumer, a resident consumer's net benefit from
state spending and taxation is CSC((1 - a)IT + (1 - )CT + (1 y)F) - CT.
All else being equal, the last expression above is what a
consumer seeks to maximize.2 4 On balance, he too is happier
when relevant state spending is higher (so long as it is not so
high that it actually becomes counterproductive), but is happier
still if such state spending is borne by others, whether income
producers or the federal government. In the simplest case, in
in whichever category they best fit. For example, a tax that is largely imposed on nonresidents will be included in F (since it feels like free money to residents of the state).
22 When a = 1 and 0 = 0, the state is not transferring wealth either from income
producers to consumers or from consumers to income producers.
23 To maximize income, one must minimize costs (at any given level of gross income);
minimizing costs is equivalent to maximizing cost savings.
2A To maximize consumption, one must minimize costs (at any given level of gross
consumption); minimizing costs is equivalent to maximizing cost savings.
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which all states possess the same technology for turning
spending into cost savings, and all states in fact choose the same
level of spending, a consumer will prefer the state that funds its
spending with the smallest amount of consumption taxes.
Of course, what ultimately matters is not what any one
state does in a vacuum, but how what that state does relates to
what other comparable states do. For example, if all states
spend only for the benefit of income producers but also impose
similar amounts of sales tax on consumers, consumers will have
no ability to flee from one state to another to avoid this
structural "unfairness." And if all states take all federal receipts
and spend them solely for the benefit of consumers, there will be
no ability for an income producer to move to counteract this
structural "unfairness." Rather, mobility on the part of income
producers or consumers matters only if (1) different states
provide different levels of benefits to either income producers or
consumers or both, and/or (2) different states fund in different
ways the benefits they provide to income producers or
consumers or both.
B. Federal Grants
First, I examine the effect of federal grants on a state's
budget process. Contrary to my model in Part II, the fifty states
do not, in fact, limit their expenditures to the amount of their
tax collections, not by a long shot. For example, in 2003, per
capita spending by the states was $4,010 per person. 25 However,
per capita tax collections were only $2,026.26 The lion's share of
the difference was amounts received from the federal
government.2 7
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the effects of political
influence and the like, there is a wide variation in the amount of
funds that states receive from the federal government. In 2004,

25 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2007, 288
(last visited

available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2007/2007edition.html
Feb. 23, 2009).
26Id. at 286.
27 Id. at 285.
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on a per capita basis, these amounts ranged from a low of $672
per person in Nevada to a high of $3,778 per person in
Wyoming. Nonetheless, twenty-one of the fifty states received
per capita amounts within 10% of the average of $1,276, while
another eleven states received per capita amounts within 20% of
such average. Surprisingly, however, only two of the five most
populous states were "near" the average:
Per Capita Revenue from Federal Government
California
Texas
New York
Florida
Illinois

$ 1,271
$ 1,106
$ 2,138
$ 955
$ 995

What is the effect of federal grants on the analysis in Part
II? The arithmetic model set forth above helps answer this
question. Thus, a resident income producer seeks to maximize
his net benefit-CSI(aIT + OCT + yF) - IT-from state spending
and taxation. Similarly, a resident consumer seeks to maximize
his net benefit-CSC((1 - a)IT + (1 - O)CT + (1 - y)F) - CT-from
state spending and taxation. It follows that so long as y is
neither equal to 0 or 1, so that both income producers and
consumers derive some benefit from federal grants, both income
producers and consumers will prefer a higher per capita level of
federal grants. A free lunch is always preferable to a paid lunch.
That being said, it is nonetheless the case that every state
should pursue a structurally sound tax-and-spend strategy,
whatever its level of federal grants. The reason for this is that a
structurally sound strategy will withstand the fickle vicissitudes
of federal spending. Sometimes a state will be blessed with a
particularly effective congressional delegation and will reap a
surfeit of pork; other times it may be burdened with a
particularly ineffective delegation and the pork will (relatively
speaking) dry up. Thus, only a foolish state will seek to rely on
allocations of generally unpredictable federal grants to mend a
structurally unsound tax-and-spend strategy.
What follows is a concrete illustration in the context of
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three states-Kentucky, Georgia and Tennessee-that are
assumed to be equivalent in all relevant ways, except for their
tax-and-spend strategies.
Kentucky has higher per capita
spending and therefore is deemed to provide greater per capita
benefits than Georgia and Tennessee; Georgia and Tennessee in
turn provide similar levels of per capita benefits, but fund them
in radically different ways. To wit, in 2003, Kentucky's per
capita spending was $4,094, Georgia's was $3,376, and
Tennessee's was $3,317.28 Kentucky collected $2,043 per capita
in taxes, almost exactly evenly divided between income taxes
($1,018) and consumption taxes ($1,025).29 Georgia, in turn,
collected $1,634 per capita in taxes, with a slightly larger
fraction coming from income taxes ($870) than from
consumption taxes ($764).30 Tennessee collected $1,617 per
capita in taxes, of which the lion's share came from consumption
taxes ($1,301), since Tennessee does not have a broad-based
individual income tax.3 1 Finally, Kentucky had per capita
federal receipts totaling $2,051; Georgia's per capita federal
receipts amounted to $1,742; and Tennessee's were $1,700.32
Suppose that all three states attempt to balance their
spending equally between items that benefit income producers
and those that benefit consumers. Under this assumption,
Kentucky spends $2,047 on behalf of each income producer and

Id. at 288.
Id. at 286. Kentucky's total tax collections amounted to $8,463 million, of which
$4,006 million were sales taxes of various sorts, $238 million were generally
consumption related license taxes (motor vehicles and hunting), $3,459 million were
income taxes of various sorts, and the remainder were business-related property taxes
and business-related license taxes. Id. at 286-87. Thus, Kentucky can be treated as
collecting almost exactly half of its taxes from consumption and half from income
production.
30 Id. at 286. The division of taxes into consumption taxes and income taxes for
Georgia follows precisely the division for Kentucky.
28
29

31

Id.

.

Id. at 285. Actually, Kentucky had per capita federal receipts totaling $1,423;
Georgia's per capita federal receipts totaled $1,014; and Tennessee's were $1,489.
However, as noted above, all items that are not taxes imposed on residents are included
in the federal receipts category. Thus, for each state, the amount of per capita federal
receipts for purposes of this paper is the excess of per capita state spending over per
capita state tax collections.
32
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each consumer; Georgia in turn spends $1,688 apiece; and
Tennessee spends $1,659 apiece.
Finally, because money is fungible, essentially any
assumption can be made as to how the states match inflows and
outflows. For example, I could assume that each state puts all
of its available revenue, from whatever source derived, into a
single pot, and then takes funds out of that pot in order to pay
for its spending. In that case, given my assumptions about uses
of funds, exactly 50% of all income tax revenue would be devoted
to spending for the benefit of income producers; exactly 50% of
all consumption tax revenue would be devoted to spending on
behalf of income producers; and so on. However, I will not make
this assumption. Instead, I will assume that each state, to the
greatest extent possible, funds spending for the benefit of
income producers from income tax revenue and spending for the
benefit of consumers from consumption tax revenue; it then uses
all remaining revenue to fill the gaps that remain.
Thus, Kentucky devotes all of its $1,018 of per capita
income tax revenue to provide benefits for income producers,
devotes all of its $1,025 of per capita consumption tax revenue to
provide benefits for consumers, and uses its federal grants to
pay for $1,029 and $1,022 of additional per capita benefits for
income producers and consumers, respectively. Georgia devotes
all of its $870 of per capita income tax revenue to provide
benefits for income producers, devotes all of its $764 of per
capita consumption tax revenue to provide benefits for
consumers, and uses its federal grants to pay for $818 and $924
of additional per capita benefits for income producers and
consumers, respectively. Finally, Tennessee devotes all of its
$316 of per capita income tax revenue to provide benefits for
income producers, devotes all of its $1,301 of per capita
consumption tax revenue to provide benefits for consumers, and
uses its federal grants to pay for $1,343 and $358 of additional
per capita benefits for income producers and consumers,
respectively.
Note that under the foregoing allocation scheme, no state,
not even Tennessee, directly diverts revenue either from income
producers to consumers or from consumers to income producers.
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However Tennessee does so in effect. To see this, and what
effect it has on behavior, insert the foregoing numbers into the
net benefit function. A Kentucky income producer receives a net
cost saving of CSI(ITKy + 0.502FKY)-ITKY = CSI($2047)-$1018
and a Kentucky consumer receives a net cost saving of
CSC(CTKY + 0.498FKY)-CTKY = CSC($2047) - $1025. A Georgia
income producer realizes a net cost saving of CSI(ITGA +
0.470FGA)-ITGA = CSI($1688)-$870 and a Georgia consumer
realizes a net cost saving of CSC(CTGA + 0.530FGA)-CTGA =
CSC($1688)-$764.
Finally, a Tennessee income producer
realizes a net cost saving of CSI(ITTN + 0.790FTN) - ITTN =
CSI($1659)-$316 and a Tennessee consumer realizes a net cost
saving of CSC(CTTN + 0.21OFTN)-CTTN = CSC($1659)-$1301.
Given the foregoing, an income producer who has
equivalent opportunities in Kentucky and Tennessee will almost
surely prefer earning income in Tennessee, since although he
will receive somewhat smaller cost savings in Tennessee
(however much cost saving an extra $388 of government
spending will buy), he will incur significantly lower tax costs
there ($702). 33 On the other hand, a consumer who has
equivalent opportunities in those two states will clearly prefer
consuming in Kentucky, since he will both receive greater cost
savings (however much cost saving an extra $388 of government
spending will buy) and incur lower tax costs ($276) in Kentucky.
Meanwhile,
an income producer who has equivalent
opportunities in Georgia and Tennessee will prefer earning
income in Tennessee, since although he will receive slightly
smaller cost savings in Tennessee (however much cost saving an
extra $29 of government spending will buy), he will incur
significantly lower tax costs there ($554). And a consumer who
has equivalent opportunities in those two states will clearly
prefer consuming in Georgia, since he will both receive greater
cost savings (however much cost saving an extra $29 of
government spending will buy) and incur significantly lower tax
33 It is reasonable to assume that at the margin, state spending produces benefits
roughly commensurate with costs. Thus, the added state benefits derived by an income
producer in Kentucky should be somewhere in the neighborhood of $388, and hence
nowhere near their effective relative "cost" to him of $702.
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costs ($537) in Georgia.
All of this may well prove to be fatal to Tennessee's
finances. This is because some persons who predominantly
produce income-such as entrepreneurs and high wage
earners-will opt to move to Tennessee to take advantage of
Tennessee's relatively much more generous treatment of income
producers, while some persons who predominantly consumesuch as retirees-will opt to move to Kentucky or Georgia. If a
great enough number of persons make these choices, then
Tennessee will face high demand for government services
beneficial to income producers but will have insufficient
consumption tax revenue to pay for such services. Federal
receipts by themselves will be unable to predictably fill in the
hole. And so, in the long run, even Tennessee's attractiveness to
income producers will wane. In short, unlike Kentucky and
probably Georgia, Tennessee's finances are unstable. 4
What can Tennessee do to overcome this instability? It has
only two choices. First, it can change its tax collection policy by
collecting a larger fraction of its revenue from income producers
and a smaller fraction from consumers. If it does this, it will be
somewhat less attractive to income producers, who will no
longer be able to come to the state for as great of a free ride.
Simultaneously, it will be slightly less unattractive to
consumers, who will no longer be furnishing quite as great a free
ride to income producers. If the change in tax collection policy is
sufficiently great, stability might ensue.
Second, Tennessee could opt to change its benefits policy.
34 Kentucky and Georgia may at first blush appear to be unstable too because they
will experience migrations opposite those of Tennessee. That is, some income producers
will leave those states, not because those states treat them unfairly, but because
Tennessee treats them too well. Some consumers will move to those states, not because
those states treat them so well, but because Tennessee treats them unfairly. But neither
of these migratory flows need be a concern, since Kentucky's and Georgia's spending and
taxation can adjust to handle them. That is, both states can always simply provide
services to each group based on the amounts they charge each group. Thus, if and when
there are fewer income producers, Kentucky and Georgia will collect less in income tax
and can simultaneously reduce their expenditures for the benefit of income producers in
like amount, which would be a perfectly logical response since there would be fewer
income producers clamoring for benefits. And an identical analysis holds with respect to
consumers.

20091

INCOME TAX AND RETAIL SALES TAX

That is, it could decide to forego providing an identical amount
(in terms of cost) of benefits for both income producers and
consumers, and could instead devote a larger share of its
spending to consumers. Once again, such a change would make
Tennessee less attractive to income producers and more
attractive to consumers, and thus would stem the flow of
migrants.
C. Internal Revenue Code Section 164
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 164, taxpayers are allowed to deduct
certain state taxes when determining their federal taxable
income. For purposes that are relevant to my discussion, these
taxes include income tax or alternatively, for taxable years
between 2004 and 2008, at the election of the taxpayer, general
sales tax.3 5 In general, a deduction of state income or sales tax
will reduce the ultimate cost of paying such tax by the amount of
the federal income tax that is saved as a result of the deduction.
For example, if 6 is the marginal federal income tax rate for a
given taxpayer, and thus the fraction of such taxpayer's
federally deducted state tax effectively rebated by the federal
government, then (1 - 6)IT is the true cost of his state income tax
payment if and only if he chooses to (and is able to) deduct such
income tax payment, and (1 - 6)CT is the true cost of his state
sales tax payment if and only if he instead chooses to (and is
able to) deduct such sales tax payment.
What does this mean for Kentucky, Georgia, and
Tennessee? Note first that a Kentucky resident will generally
choose to deduct his state income tax if he is predominantly an
income producer, but will choose to deduct his state sales tax if
A Georgia resident, in
he is predominantly a consumer.
contrast, will be somewhat predisposed to deducting his state
income tax; only if he consumes in amounts significantly in
excess of his income will he benefit from instead deducting his
state sales tax. Finally, a Tennessee resident will generally
deduct his state sales tax whether he is predominantly an
income producer or a consumer. Plugging the effect of these
35 I.R.C. §§ 164(a)(3) and (b)(5) (2008).
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deductions into the cost savings equations, average income
producers in Kentucky and Georgia realize cost savings of
CSI($2047)-(1 - 6)($1018) and CSI($1688) - (1 - 8)($870),
respectively, while average income producers in Tennessee
realize cost savings of CSI($1659) - $316.36 From this it follows
that average income producers will almost surely continue to
prefer Tennessee to Georgia, but may or may not also continue
37
to prefer Tennessee to Kentucky.
Meanwhile, average consumers in Kentucky realize cost
savings of CSC($2047)-$1025 if they do not find it in their
interest to deduct their state sales tax on their federal income
tax return and CSC($2047)-(1 - 5)($1025) if they do find it in
their interest to deduct such tax; average consumers in Georgia
realize cost savings of CSC($1688)-$764 since they generally do
not find it in their interest to deduct their state sales tax on
their federal income tax return; and average consumers in
Tennessee uniformly realize cost savings of CSC($1659)-(1 5)($1301). In spite of the available federal deduction for sales
tax payments, the average Tennessee consumer will almost
surely continue to prefer Kentucky's regimen of costs and
benefits (whether or not he elects to deduct Kentucky sales
tax).38 Similarly, the average Tennessee consumer will prefer
36 For reasons explained below, an average Kentuckian is likely to deduct his state
income tax, notwithstanding the fact that he might pay slightly more state sales tax
than income tax.
37 For example, if the relevant marginal federal income tax rate 5 = 0.2, a
Kentuckian would incur incremental tax costs vs. his Tennessee compatriot of $498 and
would receive incremental benefits that cost $388. If state spending at the relevant
margin is not too efficient, the Tennessee trade-off would be preferable; if state spending
is relatively efficient, the Kentucky trade-off would be preferable. And one can easily
imagine marginal federal income tax rates where Kentucky would have a clear
advantage. For example, if 5 = 0.31, a Kentuckian would incur incremental tax costs vs.
his Tennessee compatriot of only $386 and would receive benefits that cost a couple
dollars more. In such case, the Kentucky option would almost surely be preferable.
38 For example, if the relevant marginal federal income tax rate 3 = 0.2, a
Tennessean would still incur $16 of incremental sales tax cost vs. his Kentucky brethren
who opt not to deduct their Kentucky sales tax, but would be deprived of benefits costing
$388. Even if the relevant marginal federal income tax rate were increased to 3 = 0.31, a
Tennessean would still long for Kentucky. In such case, he would save $127 of sales tax
cost by remaining in Tennessee, but would continue to be deprived of benefits costing
$388.
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Georgia's regimen of costs and benefits. 39
Thus, while the current incarnation of section 164 may
somewhat mitigate the temptation of Tennessee's consumers to
flee to Kentucky and Georgia, it will not succeed in stopping
most of such flight. Thus, Tennessee will continue to be unable
to stabilize her finances; income producers will continue to flock
to the state demanding benefits; and consumers will continue to
flee the state and thus deprive it of the funding necessary to pay
for such benefits.
Before leaving the subject of section 164, it is worth
pointing out that for a number of reasons its effect on behavior
is far smaller than even the prior discussion would suggest.
First, in the case of any taxpayer who opts to deduct sales tax
rather than income tax (thus including the Tennessee taxpayers
in the prior paragraphs), truly extraordinary record-keeping is
required to achieve the maximum level of allowable deduction.
In recognition of this fact, any such taxpayer is allowed to take a
deduction calculated by the Treasury Department to reflect
"average consumption."4 By definition, this amount will be too
low for taxpayers who spend an unusually high percentage of
their income (e.g., it will be systematically too low for young
couples establishing their first households and for retirees who
are living off saved capital) and will be too high for taxpayers
who spend an unusually low percentage of their income (e.g., it
will be systematically too high for empty nesters who have
shifted their focus to saving for retirement).4 1 Thus, such
taxpayers will receive unintentionally incorrect deductions,
which will muddy the effect of section 164.42
Second, section 164 deductions are so-called itemized
deductions and as such are limited in a number of ways. For

39 For example, even if the relevant marginal federal income tax rate is set as high
as 6 = 0.31, a Tennessean would still incur $134 of sales tax cost above and beyond that
which he would incur in Georgia; he will receive no offsetting benefits, since Georgia
actually provides slightly greater consumer benefits than Tennessee in any event.
40 I.R.C. § 164(b)(5)(H)(ii)(I1) (2008).
41 Cf. Herwig J. Schlunk, A Lifetime Income Tax, 25 VA. TAX REV. 939 (2006).
42 In the case of Tennessee, the bias against those - in particular, retirees - who
consume disproportionately large percentages of their income, will be increased.
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taxpayers who do not have any significant amount of itemized
deductions, such deductions are valueless, since the taxpayers
will instead elect to take the federal standard deduction.4 3 For
taxpayers who have a significant amount of income, and hence
in general a significant amount of state tax payments and other
itemized deductions, the amount of such deductions that are
allowed in the calculation of federal taxable income is subject to
a phase-out. 44 Both these rules limit the benefits of the section
164 deduction, and hence push taxpayers in the direction of
making decisions that are less distorted by the effects of such
deduction.
Third, for the rapidly increasing percentage of mostly
middle and upper income taxpayers who are subject to I.R.C. §
55's alternative minimum tax, no deduction is allowed for state
tax payments.4 5 Thus, for such taxpayers, the value of the
federal income tax deduction for state income or sales tax is 0.
Hence, such taxpayers will make residency and migration
decisions utterly undistorted by the effects of the interaction of
the federal income tax and the state tax structure.
The bottom line is that the section 164 federal income tax
deduction somewhat haphazardly reduces the cost, but not the
benefit, of some state spending. 46 A state might be tempted to
use this fact strategically: it might attempt to further benefit its
residents by imposing on them, to the maximum practicable
extent, only taxes that are deductible for federal income tax
purposes. Prior to 2004, a state engaging in such strategy would
have relied predominantly on an income tax; in the period from
2004 to 2008, it would have relied either predominantly on an
income tax or predominantly on a sales tax; and beginning in
2009, assuming no extension of the current election, it would

43 I.R.C. § 63(c) (2008).
44 I.R.C. § 68.
45 I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2008).
46 To make this claim it is also necessary to assume that federal disbursement to
states are not systematically reduced to reflect the loss of tax receipts from taxpayers
residing in such states as a result of the section 164 deduction. I am not aware of any
evidence that suggests that federal disbursements to states are higher for states that

impose lower levels of state tax and that hence impose less "cost" on the Treasury.
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once again rely predominantly on an income tax. Unfortunately,
such an attempt by a state to benefit its residents is
problematic.
First, in the case of a state that engages in flip-floppingswitching from income tax collections to sales tax collections and
back to income tax collections in response to winds from
Washington-its residents will never know exactly what to
expect, and will thus be unable to effectively plan their economic
activity (whether income-producing activity or consumption
activity). This uncertainty is likely to accelerate rather than
retard outbound migration.
Second, even if a state does not alter its tax collection
strategy in response to Washington, but simply tries to
maximize its residents' deductions through each change to
section 164 by uniformly collecting predominantly an income
tax, such strategy will still, as noted above, result in a
significant (albeit possibly unintentional) transfer of resources
from income producers to consumers and thus, so long as other
comparable states do not follow identical strategies, to an
outflow of income producers and an inflow of consumers and, in
the long run, to budgetary instability.4 7 Thus, although it leaves
some federal money on the table, a state is best served by
determining its tax collection policy on the basis of its spending
policy, and not on the basis of federal income tax policy.4"

47 Of course, the very worst strategy for a state is to impose asymmetric taxation
that is predominantly of a type that is not deductible for federal income tax purposes, as
such strategy leads to a great transfer of resources from one group of residents to
another but does so without any compensating benefit in the form of a partial indirect
refund of outlays from the federal government. This is precisely the sin of states like
Tennessee that have long gone without a broad-based income tax.
48 States as a whole would be best served if the federal government got out of the
business of indirectly affecting state tax policy by means of section 164. An optimal
federal policy would either repeal the deduction for state taxes, whether income taxes or
sales taxes, or allow a deduction for all state taxes, including both income taxes and
sales taxes. In either of these two cases, there would be no asymmetry between income
taxes and sales taxes and state legislators would thus be able to have a completely clear
conscience in ignoring deductibility issues when determining their tax policy.
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D. Local Spending and Taxation
Most local governments engage in spending to provide
benefits for local income producers and consumers. 49 This
spending is largely a substitute for state spending: to the extent
that a locality funds its own police force, the state will have less
reason to provide such locality's residents with police protection;
to the extent a locality funds its own schools, the state will have
less reason to provide such locality's children with basic
education; and so on.
There is good reason to believe that local government
spending will generally be more efficient than state government
spending: the closer the spending decision is to the ultimate
beneficiaries, the more it can and will be tailored to their
peculiar wants and needs. Phrased in the terminology of this
paper, the "technology" employed by local governments to
deliver benefits to local income producers and consumers will
likely be superior to the technology employed by state
governments.
This phenomenon can be illustrated by making the
following modification to the benefits technology hypothesized in
Table 1. It will continue to be the case that the first $1 spent by
the state generates $5 of cost savings on the part of an income
producer; the second $1 generates $4 of cost savings; and so on.
However, as reflected in Table 2, to the extent that any $1 is
spent not by the state, but instead by a local government, it will
now generate an additional $1 of cost savings. Thus, if an
income producer has a choice of two similar localities, and if in
each locality he will be benefited and burdened with, for
example, $6 of spending and taxes, but if in the first locality a
higher proportion of the spending is administered by the local
government, he will prefer such locality, since the net cost
savings he receives from the combination of state and local
spending will be greater.5 °

49 Per capita spending by local governments in 2002 (the last year reported)
amounted to $3,959, while per capita spending by state governments totaled $4,010. See
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supranote 26, at 288, 292.
50 To be concrete, suppose that in Locality #1, the local government spends $4 and
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Table 2: Local and State Benefits Technology
Marginal
Local and
State
Spending

Cumulative
Local and
State
Spending

Marginal
Cost
Savings

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

6or5
5or4
4or3
3 or2
2 or 1
1 orO
0 or-1

Cumulative
Cost
SavingsOnly Local
Spending
6
11
15
18
20
21
21

Cumulative
Cost
SavingsOnly State
Spending
5
9
12
14
15
15
14

Does the higher efficiency of local spending mean that
income producers and consumers as a whole would be better
served if state governments essentially ceded spending and
taxation determinations to local governments? Unfortunately, it
does not. The main reason for this somewhat surprising answer
is that localities, like states, compete with one another for
income producers and consumers. To attract income producers
and consumers, they tend to lower taxes to a point that is
suboptimal, i.e., to a point which does not provide adequate
revenues for the provision of beneficial-i.e., efficient-public
goods. 51 To the extent that a state taxes and spends on behalf of
its local governments, it can counteract this tendency and
mitigate the harmful effects of tax competition between its local
governments.

the state government spends $2, while in Locality #2, the local government spends $3
and the state government spends $3. In such case, the income producer will receive a
benefit worth $19 in Locality #1, but a benefit worth only $18 in Locality #2.
51 "A central message of the tax competition literature is that independent
governments engage in wasteful competition for scarce capital through reduction in tax
rates and public expenditure levels." John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition,
52 NAT'L TAX J. 2, 269-304 (1999). See also Richard Baldwin and Paul Krugman,
Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9290, 2002, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9290 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2009).
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For example, in Table 2, one could imagine a local
government, competing with other local governments but left to
its own devices with respect to taxation and spending, imposing
an income tax (or equivalent property tax) of $2 on income
producers, from which such income producers would reap a cost
savings of $11, or an after-tax net benefit of $9.62 Such same
local government, still competing with other local governments
but having a backstop of $3 of state taxation and (unfortunately
somewhat less efficient) state spending, might choose to impose
an income tax (or equivalent property tax) of $1 on income
producers. If so, the local tax burden would be lower, but of
course the aggregate state and local tax burden would be higher.
Significantly, the concomitant aggregate state and local
spending level will be closer to the optimum and so the income
producer will actually be better off: he will reap cost savings of
$15, or an after-tax net benefit of $11.
There is also another reason why a state should not cede all
taxation and spending decisions to local governments: there are
some decisions that are best made with a big picture, rather
than a small picture, in mind. Thus, a state government will be
better able than a local government to coordinate spending on
such infrastructure as road systems: good roads in Memphis and
Nashville will be of little benefit to businesses attempting to
ship goods from one city to the other if there are not also good
roads in the localities between Memphis and Nashville. Similar
coordination issues arise with all manner of state spending.
While the fact of local taxation and spending will not
obviate the need for state taxation and spending, it will
nonetheless, to some extent, mitigate the effects of any
disproportion in such taxation and spending. In large part, this
is because a typical local jurisdiction's tax and spend arsenal
does not permit significant disproportion.
Of the tax revenues collected by local governments in 2002,
52 The reason it would engage in this clearly suboptimal strategy is that over the
very short-run its residents are likely to be more sensitive to the level of taxes that they
directly pay than to the level of spending on benefits that they only indirectly receive.
The constant low-tax pandering will only with a lag lead to noticeably deteriorating
infrastructure.
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roughly 73% came from property taxes, while 17% came from
sales taxes, and only 5% came from income taxes. 3 Moreover,
while local property taxes constitute a large fraction of an
average taxpayer's aggregate state and local tax bill (amounting
to nearly 28% of the total), local sales taxes do not constitute a
terribly large fraction of taxpayers' aggregate state and local
sales tax bill (amounting to only 17% of that total), and local
income taxes constitute an even smaller fraction of taxpayers'
aggregate state and local income tax bill (amounting to only 9%
of that total, and amounting to 0% in all but the handful of
localities, most prominently New York City, that impose a local
income tax).5 4
Are property taxes, like income taxes, taxes on income
producers? Or are they, like sales taxes, taxes on consumers?
The answer is that they are both. When a property tax is
imposed upon a business, it is a tax on an income producer (in
his capacity as such). When a property tax is imposed on a
residence, it is a tax imposed on a consumer (in his capacity as
such). Thus, a local jurisdiction that imposes a broad-based
property tax (and they all do) will almost by definition impose a
tax both on its resident income producers and on its resident
consumers; its tax instrument is simply too blunt to spare one
constituency at the expense of the other.
Moreover, a local jurisdiction's spending will generally not
admit a significant disproportion either. In many cases this is
obvious. In the case of a jurisdiction that is primarily business
in character (e.g., a warehouse or factory district), taxes
necessarily will be collected primarily from businesses, but
spending necessarily will be primarily for the benefit of those
very same businesses: there simply won't be anyone else upon
whom to lavish spending. And the same result will hold in the
case of a jurisdiction that is primarily residential in character.
But what of a jurisdiction which contains significant numbers of
both businesses and residences? Given the small size of the
typical local jurisdiction, it will almost certainly be the case that

63
4

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 25, at 290.
See id. at 288, 290.
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most benefits spending will necessarily benefit both the income
producers and the consumers in the jurisdiction. For example, a
police patrol that passes businesses will almost inevitably pass
residences as well. Thus, spending on the police patrol must
properly be characterized as spending both for the benefit of
55
income producers and for the benefit of consumers.
The fact of local taxation and spending with its inherent
built-in lack of disproportion-its fairness-ensures that some
significant portion of the aggregate of state and local taxation
and spending will be conducted proportionately. It does not,
however, eliminate the need for a state to conduct its taxation
and spending in a proportional way. To demonstrate this, I
return to the example of Kentucky, Georgia, and Tennessee. In
2002, Kentucky localities collected per capita taxes of $686 and
engaged in per capita spending of $1,528; Georgia localities
collected per capita taxes of $1,204 and engaged in per capita
spending of $2,448; and Tennessee localities collected per capita
taxes of $894 and engaged in per capita spending of $2,619.56
For purposes of analysis, I fit these numbers into my prior
formulae by assuming that half of the tax collections come from
income producers and that half of the expenditures are for the
benefit of income producers; similarly for consumers.
Thus, an average Kentucky income producer realizes a net
cost saving of CSI($2047 + $764)-($1018 + $343) =
CSI($2811)-($1361) and an average Kentucky consumer
receives a net cost saving of CSC($2047 + $764)-($1025 + $343)
= CSI($2811)-($1368). An average Georgia income producer
realizes a net cost saving of CSI($1688 + $1224)-($870 + $602)
= CSI($2912)-($1472) and an average Georgia consumer
realizes a net cost saving of CSC($1688 + $1224)-($764 + $602)
55 Of course, some such overlap is inevitable with respect to state spending as well.
However, given the wider geographic reach of most states, the degree of overlap will
often be less. For example, if a state concentrates its police patrols in areas that are
primarily business in character, it is by no means inevitable that a significant part of the
residential population of the state will benefit.
- See U.S. CENsus BuREAu, supra note 25, at 288, 290. To avoid double counting,
any expenditure that is funded by revenue provided by such locality's state government
is not counted as a local expenditure; such expenditure is instead treated as a state
expenditure.
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= CSC($2912)-($1366). Finally, an average Tennessee income
producer realizes a net cost saving of CSI($1659 + $1310)($316 + $447) = CSI($2969)-($763) and an average Tennessee
consumer realizes a net cost saving of CSC($1659 + $1310)($1301 + $477) = CSC($2969)-($1778).
Given the foregoing, an income producer who has
equivalent opportunities in Kentucky and Tennessee will prefer
earning income in Tennessee, since he will both receive greater
cost savings (however much cost saving an extra $158 of
government spending will buy) and incur significantly lower tax
costs ($598) in Tennessee. On the other hand, a consumer who
has equivalent opportunities in those two states will almost
surely prefer consuming in Kentucky, since although he will
receive somewhat smaller cost savings in Kentucky (however
much cost saving an extra $158 of government spending will
buy), he will incur significantly lower tax costs there ($410).
Meanwhile,
an income producer who has equivalent
opportunities in Georgia and Tennessee will prefer earning
income in Tennessee, since he will both receive greater cost
savings (however much cost saving an extra $57 of government
spending will buy) and incur significantly lower tax costs ($709)
in Tennessee.
However, a consumer who has equivalent
opportunities in those two states will almost surely prefer
consuming in Georgia, since although he will receive somewhat
smaller cost savings in Georgia (however much cost saving an
extra $57 of government spending will buy), he will incur
significantly lower tax costs in that state ($412). Thus, the
presence of local government taxation and spending will not
produce stability for Tennessee's fiscal system.
E. Efficiency of State Expenditures
Purely for illustrative purposes, I posited a state benefits
technology complete with diminishing marginal returns in Table
1, and then amended it to incorporate a somewhat more efficient
local benefits technology in Table 2.
Neither of these
technologies was intended to bear any particular relationship to
reality; it is a probably unanswerable, empirical question as to
exactly how much benefit any or even a typical income producer
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or consumer derives from state or local government
expenditures.
Indeed, at one extreme, it is theoretically possible, albeit
highly improbable, that income producers and consumers derive
no (or even negative) benefit from state and local government
spending. To wit, anti-tax crusaders and other anti-government
types frequently oppose all taxation and hence a fortiori all
government spending (at whatever level of government) by
making the argument that only the people themselves know
what they really want. If so, then the people should be allowed
to spend their own money, rather than having it taxed away by
politicians who will invariably spend it less wisely. Implicit (or
perhaps even explicit) in this argument is the notion that at
least for the typical income producer and consumer, the state's
spending of the marginal $1 of income or sales tax revenue, as
the case may be, will generate less than $1 of beneficial cost
savings.
While an excess of cost over benefit may in fact exist at a
given state's margin 57-another probably unanswerable
empirical question-it is highly unlikely that cost will exceed
benefit in such state at every possible level of taxation and
spending. This is because much state spending is devoted to
public goods that would be underprovided, or not provided at all,
if not for state government. Indeed, at the extreme, a society
without taxes and spending of any kind is a society without
government: a society in the state of nature. Perhaps Marsha
Blackburn and Phil Valentine are sufficiently strong and clever
that they would prefer to live in the state of nature; I however
must sadly confess that I am not.58 My bedrock working
assumption, therefore, is that some level of state taxation is
absolutely indispensable in order for income producers and
consumers to maximize their utilities. If this is not true, and if
any and all state spending is counterproductive, then a potential
migrant's optimal decision would be trivially easy: migrate to

57 I allowed for this possibility in Tables 1 and 2.

-

Cf. Walker, supra note 1.
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whichever state offers the lowest level of taxation.5 9
Once the state of nature is rejected as a serious policy
choice, and the existence of some level of beneficial state
taxation and spending is conceded, the analysis becomes more
interesting but also more complicated. The difficulty is that the
optimal level of state taxation and spending may be different in
different states. One reason for such differences is that a state
like California, with a high population, might benefit from
economies of scale in the provision of benefits; if so, it should be
able to deliver more benefits per $1 of tax revenue than could a
state like Wyoming with a low population. Another reason is
that topography may be relevant to spending efficiency:
providing good roads may be cheaper in a flat state like Kansas
than in a mountainous state like Colorado. And other factorslocation, climate, population density, natural resources, the
presence of complementary businesses, etc. may come into play
as well.
One way to illustrate the dramatic, but also perhaps
somewhat surprising, effects of disparate state benefits
technologies is to work through a simple hypothetical. Thus,
consider a head-to-head comparison of two states, State A and
State B. For simplicity, each state has only two residents, one
income producer and one consumer.
Hence the global
population consists of IncA, IncB, ConsA, and ConsB. Suppose
that each state wants to provide $1 of benefit to each income
producer and each consumer, but that in order to do this, State
A must spend $1 for each income producer and each consumer,
while State B must only spend $0.50 for each income producer

59 Technically, the absence of state (and local) government would not result in the
state of nature, since the federal government would presumably remain in place. But
just as taxation and spending by a state is primarily a backstop to inadequate levels of
local taxation and spending, so is taxation and spending by the federal government
primarily a backstop to inadequate state taxation and spending. (For example, without
such backstop, there would likely be inadequate spending on national defense, and what
spending there was would likely be uncoordinated and duplicative.) A backstop,
however, is not a substitute. A state that is protected from foreign attack, but that has
no roads and schools and police force, would not be a particularly hospitable place for
most income producers and consumers. Indeed, it would be a state not worth the
expense or the trouble to protect from foreign attack.
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In other words, State B's benefits
and each consumer.
technology is twice as efficient as State A's.
Suppose that State A decides to impose both an income tax
and a sales tax: it collects $1 of income tax from each income
producer and $1 of sales tax from each consumer. State B, on
the other hand, decides to give income producers a pass; it funds
all of its benefits by simply imposing $1 of sales tax on its
consumer. The net effect of these strategies is that neither
consumer has any incentive to relocate.
Each consumer,
whether residing in State A or State B, pays $1 of tax and
receives $1 of benefit. Thus, while ConsB may have some cause
to complain of "unfairness," he has no recourse in the face of
such unfairness.
However, note that income producers may have a reason to
migrate. IncA pays $1 of tax and receives $1 of benefit, which is
not in itself unfair, but he notices that IncB pays no income tax
and yet receives the same $1 of benefit. This fact may motivate
IncA to relocate to State B. Suppose he does so. Now State B
has three residents, including two income producers. If it
continues to eschew an income tax, it must increase the amount
of sales tax it collects from ConsB. To wit, ConsB must pay
$1.50 of sales tax, as this will fund the requisite $3 of benefits.
Now ConsB pays $1.50 of tax but receives only $1 of benefit,
while his counterpart in State A, ConsA, pays $1 of tax and
receives $1 of benefit. ConsB may thus be motivated to relocate
to State A.
Where does it all end? Both consumers will reside in State
A, paying $1 of sales tax and receiving $1 of benefit, and both
income producers will reside in State B, paying no income tax
and receiving no benefit! Thus, even though the states have
different benefits technologies, in equilibrium, symmetry is
restored between the amount of taxes each individual pays and
the amount of spending that is conducted on his behalf! Alas,
this is not a general result: one can imagine technologies where
asymmetries could persist in equilibrium. On the other hand,
symmetry will always be an available equilibrium. And it will
always be an available equilibrium that has much to recommend
it: it will be the only equilibrium that is devoid of surreptitious
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transfers either from income producers to consumers, or from
consumers to income producers; it will be the only equilibrium
that is truly "fair."
Moreover, while an asymmetric equilibrium in the case of
two states can readily be concocted, there is reason to believe
that such equilibrium is unlikely. This is because a given state
is not in competition with only one other state, but with fortynine other states, and some of those states are likely to have
very similar attributes and hence very similar benefits
technologies to its own. And it turns out that when technologies
are similar, an asymmetric equilibrium will not result.
For example, one can view the dilemma of a state like
Tennessee as follows. First, Tennessee generally need not
concern itself too much with whether its benefits technology is
better or worse than that of Alaska or California; the attributes
of Tennessee, Alaska, and California are sufficiently different
that migration decisions between such states are unlikely to be
greatly affected by state taxation and spending policy. 0
However, Tennessee should concern itself with whether its
benefits technology is better or worse than that of Kentucky or
Georgia; the attributes of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia are
sufficiently similar that migration decisions between such states
may well be affected by state taxation and spending policy. But
60 More generally, not all relevant differences in locations result from state or local
government spending and taxation. Aspen's breathtaking views, San Diego's temperate
sun, Alaska's crude oil reserves, Boston's universities, and New York's concentration of
financial intermediaries are not the result of state and local government spending and
taxation. Yet any of these features, and many others too, may be as or more important
to many income producers or consumers when they are faced with the decision on where
to locate. (I have not yet met a professor who turned down an appointment at Harvard
because he disliked Massachusetts' tax and spend policies!) Since all such features
benefit or burden only persons working and/or living in the given location, the benefits
and burdens should generally be fully reflected in a combination of income (i.e., salary)
differentials and cost of living (i.e., property value and rent) differentials. Cf. Michael S.
Knoll & Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes for Regional Living
Costs and Amenities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 987, 1008-12 (2003). The phenomenon of
capitalization will be addressed below. The bottom line is that while such features may
be a cause of migration, they will ultimately be fully reflected in prices (i.e., there will be
an equilibrium, and it will be stable), and thus the presence or absence of such features
will not lead to financial instability for state governments in the same way that a faulty
tax and spend policy will.
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of course it is precisely because the attributes of Tennessee,
Kentucky, and Georgia are similar that there is no reason to
suppose that their state benefits technologies will be very
different. Thus, with respect to such states, equilibrium will
likely only result when each state adopts a symmetric taxation
and spending policy.
F. Capitalization
The analysis so far has assumed that state taxes and
expenditures are not capitalized into asset prices, and that
individuals are accordingly able to avoid the cost of state tax
policy and capture the benefit of state spending through the
simple expedient of migration. But this assumption may be
false.
To illustrate, consider an income producer IncA residing in
State A, whose business assets in a world without state taxes
and benefits would generate net cash flow in perpetuity of $90
per year. These assets, in a world with 10% interest rates, have
a fair market value of $900. Now suppose that State A imposes
$4 of income tax and lavishes $4 of spending upon IncA. In
conformity with Table 1, assume the spending allows IncA to
enjoy annual cost savings of $14. Thus, IncA's business assets
now generate-at least so long as State A's tax and spending
policy remains unchanged-net cash flow of $100 per year.
Assuming full capitalization of taxes and benefits (as well as no
change to the 10% interest rate), such assets now have a fair
market value of $1,000.
Living next door in State B is another income producer,
IncB, whose business assets in a world without state taxes and
benefits would generate net cash flow in perpetuity of $85 per
year. These assets, in a world with 10% interest rates, have a
fair market value of $850. Now suppose that State B, in the
spirit of Tennessee, imposes no income tax upon IncB, but
nevertheless somehow manages to lavish $5 of spending upon
him. In conformity with Table 1, assume the spending allows
IncB to enjoy annual cost savings of $15. Thus, IncB's business
assets now generate-at least so long as State B's tax and
spending policy remains unchanged-net cash flow of $100 per
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year. Assuming full capitalization of taxes and benefits (as well
as no change to the 10% interest rate), such assets now also
have a fair market value of $1,000.
One could hardly blame IncA if he covets State B's more
pro-income-producer tax and spending policy: in such state he
would pay 4 less in income tax and would receive 1 more in cost
savings. However, what happens if IncA decides to migrate to
State B? Assuming, importantly, that IncA's business assets are
not mobile, he must sell them and then use the proceeds to buy
alternative business assets in State B. A sale of his assets
would generate $1,000 of proceeds; such proceeds would exactly
suffice to buy IncB's business assets. However, if he buys IncB's
business assets, he would continue to generate exactly $100 per
year of cash flow, after taking taxes and spending into account.
Because state tax and spending policies are fully reflected in
asset prices, migration cannot make IncA better off,
notwithstanding State B's preferable policies.
Accordingly,
there will be no migration, and thus State B's asymmetric tax
and spending policy will be stable!
Alas, full or even partial capitalization is exceedingly
unlikely. First and foremost, IncA's business assets will include,
and indeed may even be limited to, his human capital. This
asset is generally extremely mobile: it does not need to be,
indeed generally cannot be, sold in State A and repurchased in
State B. Without a need to sell and repurchase, IncA can simply
transport his business asset (i.e., himself) across state lines: his
asset will continue to generate $90 per year before taking taxes
and spending into account; he will net an additional $15 per
year due to State B's tax and spending policy; thus, migration
will make sense. And the same result will obtain for many
assets other than human capital: intangible property including
intellectual property is generally very mobile; much personal
property is very mobile as well. It is only when one is in the
realm of real property-factories and warehouses and the like61
that capitalization of any type becomes a problem.
61 Even real business property is somewhat "mobile" in the sense that its supply is
not fixed in the long run. The shorter the time frame for bringing new real business
property on line, the smaller the degree of capitalization will be even with respect to
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What does full capitalization look like in the realm of real
property? No rational income producer will assume that a
state's tax and spending policy, in particular an unsustainable
tax and spending policy, will remain unchanged in perpetuity.
Thus, the most that is likely to be capitalized into the fair
market value of real business property is the effect of a baseline
sustainable tax and spending policy plus the effect of at most a
few years' worth of asymmetry.
Thus, for example, IncB's
property might take a fair market value of $960 rather than
either $1,000 (assuming full capitalization of State B's
asymmetric tax and spending policy) or $950 (assuming full
capitalization of only a baseline sustainable symmetric policy a
la State A). 62 Note that this property value, in spite of fully
capitalizing the best expectations of future tax and spending
policy, might nonetheless induce IncA to migrate to State B: it
all depends on whether IncA has a different assessment from
the market as a whole as to the length of time that State B will
maintain its ultimately unsustainable tax and spending policy.63
Even in the realm of real property, there will often be only
partial capitalization rather than full capitalization. The major
reason is that any state tax and spending policy will impact
different income producers differently. For example, one income
producer may be able to reduce the impact of his state income
tax burden by virtue of section 164's deduction, while another
such property.
62 This value assumes that State B's policies will be maintained for approximately
four years prior to reverting to something sustainable. The calculus performed by a
potential buyer with $1,000 to spend, such as IncA, is as follows. If $960 will buy an
asset that generates $85 of annual cash flow (ignoring the state's contribution), $1,000
will buy an asset that generates $88.50 of perpetual cash flow (again ignoring the state's
contribution). A sustainable state tax and spending policy, a la State A, will add $10 per
year of net cash flow, thus guaranteeing that the owner of a $1,000 asset will receive at
least $98.50 per year in perpetuity. But due to the asymmetry of State B's tax and
spending policy, the owner of the asset will in fact temporarily generate an additional $5
per year of net cash. If such extra net cash is generated for exactly four years, it will
properly compensate IncA for the fact that the long-run cash flow of his State B asset is
slightly below that of his State A asset.
63 If the $5 of extra net cash flow referenced in the prior footnote is generated for less
than four years, then IncA will, with 20-20 hindsight, have overpaid for the State B
asset; if such extra net cash flow is generated for more than four years, IncA will, with
20-20 hindsight, have underpaid for the asset.
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may not be able to do so. One income producer may derive a
benefit from a particular length of state road, while another may
not be able to do so. Thus, what will be capitalized is at most
the cost and the benefit obtained by the marginal income
producer. And that leaves the door wide open to migration by
income producers who are not at the margin.
Finally, it is likely that the degree of capitalization is
greater for benefits or taxes tied directly to property, rather
than for benefits or taxes not tied directly to property. For
example, if the state has furnished a road that gives easy access
to a factory, the reduced transportation costs are essentially a
feature of the factory. Or if a state has ensured peace and quiet
by providing an adequate social safety net, the favorable
business environment it fosters is also essentially a feature of
business property located in the state. And, of course, if a
property tax encumbers a piece of business property, such tax is
very directly a feature of the encumbered property. The effects
of all of these items are therefore relatively likely to be
capitalized into the fair market value of property. However, the
effects of an income tax that has a different impact on every
income producer and that is not in any sense tied to any one
piece of property is relatively unlikely to be capitalized into the
fair market value of property.
What result? Looking again at IncA, his property may well
increase in value to reflect the $14 per year of cost savings he
receives from State A, but is unlikely to decrease in value to
reflect the income taxes he pays to State A. Thus, assuming a
10% interest rate, his property is likely to have a fair market
value of $1,040. Similarly, IncB's property may well increase in
value to reflect the $15 per year of cost savings he receives from
State B, and thus might take a fair market value of $1,000.
Under these predicates, IncA has every incentive to move: doing
so will increase his annual net cash flow by $4. Indeed, under
these predicates an income producer's decision-making becomes
trivially easy: he always wants to go to whichever jurisdiction
imposes upon him the lowest income tax burden. But that
desire is precisely what makes the finances of such jurisdiction
unstable: there will be inadequate revenue to pay for all of the
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benefits demanded by the influx of income producers.
For consumers, the analysis is somewhat different. By
definition, every resident consumer owns or leases an immobile
real asset: his residence. Thus, a higher degree of capitalization
of state taxes and benefits into asset prices or living costs is
inevitable. But for similar reasons to those set forth above,
capitalization is likely to be partial rather than full.6 4 Moreover,
for the same reasons set forth above, state benefits and property
taxes are much more likely to be capitalized into fair market
value than are state sales taxes, since potential sales taxes are
much more tenuously tied to a consumer's residence (after all,
they can be avoided and/or indefinitely deferred by the
expedient of simply not consuming). Thus, in spite of some
degree of capitalization, and as was the case with income
producers, savvy consumers are likely to short-circuit a more
nuanced calculus and migrate to those jurisdictions that offer
them the lowest sales tax burden. That migration is precisely
what may make the finances of such jurisdictions unstable:
there will be inadequate revenue to pay for all of the benefits
demanded by the influx of consumers.
G. Active Income Producers and Passive Investors
The discussion so far has lumped all income producers into
a single category. They have been deemed to pay (or not pay)
state income taxes based upon their income and their home
state's income tax policy; and they have been deemed to receive
benefits (cost savings) from their home state based on such
state's expenditures for the benefit of income producers. There
is nothing objectionable to this in the case of income producers
who actively produce income in a state, be they individuals who
earn income from their labor in the state or businesses that earn
income from their capital deployed in the state.
However, the description generally fails to accurately
describe income producers who are resident in a state to the
64 Cf. Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local
Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 447 (1996) (noting that
"perfect capitalization" rarely describes reality).
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extent that they earn passive income: interest, dividends, rents,
capital gains, and so on. Such residents directly or indirectly
own capital that with significant likelihood is not deployed in
their state of residence (after all, they may invest in any one of
the remaining forty-nine states, or anywhere else in the world).
To the extent that such residents earn passive income that is
taxed in their home state but that is derived from capital located
elsewhere, it will be next to impossible for their home state to
engage in expenditures that facilitate or in any way benefit their
production of income. Rather, it is only the state in which their
capital is actually deployed that will be able to provide
appropriate benefits.
The appropriate state response to this fact should be
obvious; the model I introduced above can be easily generalized.
Taxpayers actually need to be divided into three groups rather
than just two: to (active) income producers and consumers must
be added (passive) investors.
Following such division and
applying precisely the same methodology as above, fiscal
stability (and fairness) requires every state to impose taxes on
each of these three groups in an amount that is proportional to
its expenditure on benefits for such group. Since it is next to
impossible for a state to spend any significant amount of money
that will benefit passive investors in their capacity as such, it
follows that a state should generally not impose any tax at all on
passive investors. Thus, a state like Tennessee, which does not
impose an income tax on active wage income, but does impose an
income tax on passive interest and dividend income, has got its
income tax policy exactly backwards!
To be clear, I am not suggesting that passive investors
should receive a pass on taxation. But they generally don't. A
passive investor owns capital that is actively deployed
somewhere. It is to that somewhere that the passive investor
should and generally does (directly or indirectly) pay a tax that
reflects the benefits he receives from that somewhere. For
example, if the passive investor owns corporate stock, his direct
and indirect tax bill could and probably should be limited to a
corporate income tax imposed directly upon the corporation.
And if the passive investor owns a debt instrument, his direct
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and indirect tax bill should probably consist solely of a
withholding tax upon the interest he receives, where the
proceeds of such withholding tax are appropriately divided
among the states in which the borrower conducts its business.
Finally, if the passive investor owns rental property, his direct
and indirect tax bill could (and indeed usually does) take the
form of an income tax imposed upon him by the state in which
the rental property is located.
H. Does the Presence of an Individual Income Tax Lead to
Higher Overall Levels of Taxation?
One reason that activists in a state (like Tennessee) that
lacks an individual income tax (or, in the case of Tennessee, a
broad-based individual income tax) generally oppose the
imposition of such a tax is a fear that the very existence of such
a tax, even at an arbitrarily low rate, will inevitably lead to
higher overall levels of taxation in the state. The story is a
simple one. Politicians love to spend taxpayer money. 65 Thus,
they constantly try to increase the level of state spending. But
in the long run, they can only succeed if they can find additional
revenue. Alas, state revenue comes from a limited number of
sources, and these can only be tapped so often. Thus, there is
some constraint on spending growth. But if a state that has not
heretofore enacted an income tax enacts an income tax, it will
have an additional source of revenue. 66 This means that there
will be less of a constraint on spending growth. Ergo, there will
be more spending. And more spending generally means higher
overall levels of taxation.
As already noted, there is much reason to believe that

65 Of course, the reason they love to spend taxpayer money is that taxpayers love it
when they do. Moreover, this love is rational so long as the spending on balance is
efficient. The activists assume that the spending is not efficient. They further assume
that the taxpayers who support it are duped: the taxpayers only see the benefits but
never think about the costs.
66 Of course, every state has an income tax as a potential source of revenue. In a
state without a current income tax, it is quite difficult to tap this source since tapping it
requires actually enacting an income tax. In a state that already has an income tax, it is
relatively easy to tap this source since tapping it merely requires raising tax rates.
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higher overall levels of state spending, and concomitant higher
overall levels of taxation, are a good thing since spending in
most states is probably suboptimally low.6 7 Nonetheless, the
emotional appeal of the an-income-tax-will-lead-to-biggergovernment argument should not be underestimated since it will
always be possible to find, in any state's budget, some truly
shameless examples of wasteful pork.
But is the argument even true? Do states that impose an
income tax really have a higher level of overall per capita
taxation than states that do not impose an income tax? Of the
seven states that did not impose any individual income tax
whatsoever in 2004, per capita taxes were lower than average in
three states, essentially average in two states, and above
average in the remaining two states. 68 For the same states,
taxes collected as a percentage of income were lower than
average in three of them, essentially average in three more, and
above average in only one state.
Taxes in States Without an Individual Income Tax
Alaska
Florida
Nevada
South Dakota
Texas
Washington
Wyoming

Per Capita Taxes
$ 2,035
$1,756
$2,031
$1,378
$1,368
$ 2,239
$ 2,974

Taxes as a Percentage of Income
5.99%
5.58%
6.01%
4.56%
4.45%
6.39%
8.68%

U.S. Average

$ 2,026

6.13%

It is interesting to compare the seven states without any
individual income tax to the five states without any general
retail sales tax. Of these five states, per capita taxes were lower
than average in three states, essentially average in one state,
See Wilson, supranote 51.
This list does not include Tennessee since Tennessee does impose an income tax,
albeit one limited to interest and dividend income.
67
68
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and above average in the remaining state. For the same states,
taxes collected as a percentage of income were lower than
average in two states, essentially average in two more, and
above average in only one.
Taxes in States without a General Retail Sales Tax
Alaska
Delaware
Montana
New Hampshire
Oregon
U.S. Average

Per Capita Taxes
$ 2,035
$ 2,862
$1,754
$1,544
$1,700
$ 2,026

Taxes as a Percentage of Income
5.99%
8.01%
6.34%
4.22%
5.56%
6.13%

What do these results demonstrate? Very little, I think.
Nonetheless, they certainly belie a powerful link between the
existence of an individual income tax and a high overall tax
burden. Moreover, any such link is no stronger than the link
between the existence of a general retail sales tax and a high
overall tax burden.
More significantly, it seems clear that most states that opt
to impose only one of the two classic types of taxes have found a
For
viable alternative-albeit still a tax-to such taxes.
example, Alaska, which imposes neither an individual income
tax nor a general retail sales tax derives most of its tax revenue
from income and severance taxes imposed on corporations
Texas and Wyoming also derive
(primarily oil companies).
significant revenues from severance taxes. Nevada follows a
different tack, deriving significant revenue from selective sales
taxes that primarily impact gamblers and tourists. Delaware
derives significant revenue from corporate licensing fees. And
Washington is one of the few states to derive significant revenue
from a state property tax (timberland). Therefore, I would argue
that it is not so much that states keep taxes low by eschewing
the imposition of an individual income tax, a retail sales tax, or
both but that some states have found an alternative

20091

INCOME TAX AND RETAIL SALES TAX

constituency generally largely concentrated outside the state
upon which to foist a portion of their tax burden. These states
are thus able to persuade local residents-through their
eschewing of one type of tax or the other-that they are
philosophically opposed to high levels of taxation, even though
they manifestly are not.
None of which is to say that people should not flock to
states that have found a way to finance themselves that does not
From the perspective of a
rely on taxing local residents.
prospective income producer or a prospective consumer, the
ability of a state to finance benefits by taxing outsiders is free
money, and thus a definite plus. But for states that have no
such viable outside sources-including prominently my home
state of Tennessee-it is fruitless to try to emulate such lucky
states.
IV. SOME EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
Several empirical studies have examined some of the claims
made in this paper. 9 Unfortunately, they all focus solely on
location choices and/or migration of retirees, thus excluding
much of the relevant population. Nonetheless, their conclusions
are uniformly consistent with what one would expect, given my
arguments.
Duncombe, Robbins, and Wolf find that retirees are
attracted by locations with "comparatively high public sector
spending on public safety and recreational services."7 In other
words, they recognize state and local government spending that
directly benefits them and act as one would expect in light of
such information. Moreover, retirees "avoid [locations with
relatively high] inheritance, property and sales taxes."7i Since
all retirees are consumers, this is hardly a surprise. Finally,
69 William Duncombe, Mark Robbins & Douglas Wolf, Retire to Where? A Discrete

Choice Model of Residential Location, 7 INT. J. POPUL. GEOGR. 281, 281-93 (2001); Karen
Conway & Andrew Houtenville, Do the elderly "vote with their feet?", 97 PUBLIC CHOICE
663, 663-85 (1998); Richard Cebula, A Brief Empirical Note on the Tiebout Hypothesis
and State Income Tax Policies, 67 PUBLIC CHOICE 87, 87-89 (1990).
70 Duncombe, supra note 69, at 290.
71 Id.
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"whites, but not non-whites, are also repelled by income taxes. 7 2
At first blush, this seems harder to explain. However, if it is the
case that white retirees as a rule have more retirement savings
than non-whites,7 3 the explanation is obvious. A retiree with
savings is a passive income producer, and so will avoid any state
that taxes his (necessarily passive) income, since such state will
find it impossible to provide him with corresponding benefits.
On the other hand, a retiree without savings and hence without
taxable income, should prefer a state that imposes a tax on
(passive) income because such state will have an additional
revenue source that from his vantage looks exactly like a federal
receipt or a tax imposed on persons outside of the state: it is a
revenue source that is potentially available to provide the
proverbial free lunch.
Conway and Houtenville find that "states with high tax
shares (reflecting low federal aid or chronic surpluses, and a
higher price for public services) experience greater outmigration."7 4 In other words, retirees prefer states with benefits
that are paid for by persons other than themselves. They also
find that relatively high income taxes lead to out-migration, but
to them more surprisingly that "heavy reliance of personal
income taxes increases in-migration. 75
I do not find this
surprising at all. As just noted, income taxes on retirees are
necessarily imposed on passive income, and thus are
accompanied by no corresponding state benefits. As a result,
one would expect retirees who own assets that generate passive
income to migrate to states with relatively low income taxes,
and one would expect retirees who do not own a significant
amount of such assets to migrate to states with relatively high
income taxes and a concomitant opportunity for a free lunch.
72

Id.

73 The average net worth of non-Hispanic white households in 2000 was $198,184

while that of Hispanic households was $51,908 and that of black households was
$35,284. Hous. and Household Econ. Statistics Div., U.S. Census Bureau, Table 5: Asset
Ownership
of
Households
2000
(2005)
available
at
http://www.census.govlhheswww/wealthl1998_2000/wlthOO-5.html (last visited Feb 23,
2009). It is plausible that similar numbers would obtain for retirees.
74 Conway & Houtenville, supra note 69, at 678.
75 Id. at 678-79.
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Finally, Cebula, in a much narrower study that focused not
on relative income tax rates but simply on the presence or
absence of a state income tax, found that "elderly consumervoters express a strong preference for states without personal
income taxes."76 His study looked solely at in-migration, and is
therefore completely consistent with Conway and Houtenville.
The story once again is that retirees who own assets that
generate passive income will try to relocate to states in which
they are not taxed for the provision of benefits they cannot and
do not receive.
V. CONCLUSION

Most states-including my home state of Tennessee-have
only one viable stable tax and spending policy. Whether the
state desires to provide lots of benefits to its residents or only a
few, it is of paramount importance that it properly charges the
costs of such benefits to the constituencies to which the benefits
are provided. Thus, to the extent that a state provides benefits
to income producers, it must impose an income (or equivalent)
tax on such income producers to pay for their benefits. And to
the extent that it provides benefits to consumers, it must
likewise impose a sales (or equivalent) tax on consumers. Since
every state provides at least some benefits to both income
producers and to consumers, it follows that every state must, so
long as it desires fiscal stability, impose both an income tax and
a retail sales (or equivalent consumption) tax.

76 Cebula, supra note 69, at 89.

